(Transcribed by Leora White, September 2007)

THE PUBLIC CAREER OF ARSENE P. PUJO

LOUISIANA CONGRESSMEN, 1903 - 1913

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the

Louisiana State University and

Agricultural and Mechanical

College in partial fulfillment of the 

Requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

The Department of History

by

James Carroll Beam

B. A. McNeese State College, 1955

January, 1963

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professors Donald Millett, William Hair and Burl Noggle for their assistance in the preparation of this thesis.  Professor Millet suggested the topic and rendered assistance in research and Professors Hair and Noggle aided in research and in reading thesis drafts.  The writer also wishes to acknowledge his wife whose patience has made completion of the thesis possible.  

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT          

ABSTRACT  

CHAPTER
    I. CITIZEN PUJO
    II. PUJO AND LOUISIANA POLITICS
    III. THE EARLY YEARS IN CONGRESS, 1903-1907
    IV. LATER CONGRESSIONAL TERMS, 1907-1913
    V. THE MONEY TRUST INQUIRY
    VI. THE PUJO REPORT
    VII. THE SENATE RACE AND RETIREMENT

BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX
VITA  

ABSTRACT

Arsene Paulin  Pujo (1861-1939), prominent Lake Charles, Louisiana attorney, devoted much of his lifetime to serving local, state, and national governments.  An advocate of the direct primary, he always put his candidacy for public office before the people of his state.  His individualism was apparent throughout his public service.  From 1903 to 1913, he served the Seventh Congressional District of Louisiana in the United States House of Representatives.  Labor, industrial, and agricultural interests benefited from the legislation he supported and the appropriations he secured.  An examination of the public records reveals that Pujo voted for and supported many of the progressive measures characteristic of the period in which he was a representative.  At the same time, he supported conservative views which indicated he was not confined in his political thinking.

Pujo gained national recognition when he served as chairman of the Money Trust Investigation of 1912-1913.  The inquiry revealed that J. P. Morgan and his associates controlled corporations with assets greater than the assessed value of all the property west of the Mississippi River. The investigation did not result in any direct legislation, but it did influence laws designed to remedy the existing financial inequities.

During World War I, Pujo served on the United States Selective Service Board for the Western District of Louisiana and on the Louisiana Council of Defense.  His adeptness in the interpretation of the Selective Service Act illustrated an inherent understanding of most laws dating back as far as the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898.  Pujo’s effectiveness as a public servant may be judged in light of the fact that while in Congress, he secured appropriations for the Seventh District which exceeded all the money expended by the Federal government in the district during the century of American rule before his election.  

CHAPTER  I

CITIZEN PUJO

Paul Pujo emigrated from Tarbes, Haute-Pyrenees, France in 1837 and in 1849 settled in Lake Charles, Louisiana.  Paul’s father, Pascal Pujo, and his brothers were soldiers in the armies of Napoleon.  His mother, Rose Margaret deBroca, was the daughter of Count Paul Francois deBroca of Tieste, Haute-Pyrenees, France.  After settling in Louisiana, Paul married Eloise Minerva LeBleu and later fought in the Civil War.  When the war was over, Paul returned to Lake Charles and established a mercantile store in the growing Louisiana town.  At that time most supplies were hauled overland by wagon into Lake Charles from Houston, Texas.   Located on the lakefront, Pujo’s store was the only one in Lake Charles in 1868 and the merchandise he stocked was said to be worth less than one hundred dollars.  His business was successful and he remained a merchant until two years before his death. (1)

Paul’s wife was a native of Louisiana and the daughter of Arsene and Eliza Milhomme Le Bleu.  Arsene LeBleu was a planter and stock raiser and one of the wealthy and influential citizens of his community.  The Pujo family made their home at Rose Bluff, a small area located on the Calcasieu River about two miles west of Lake Charles, and spent remainder of their lives in the community.  Pujo was prominently identified with the growth of Lake Charles and one of the main streets of the city bears his name. (2)

Arsene Paulin Pujo, born December 16, 1861, was the third of four children born to the Pujo’s. (3)  Although Arsene attended public and private schools in Lake Charles, he was described as a self-educated man.  Although not entirely a self-made man, a friend said of him in 1902: 

Mr. Pujo is not the product of any college or university.  He is a self-educated and self-made man.  He began to learn what he knows at that late period of life when others more fortunate went out of colleges already well equipped for the battle of life; yet he ranks high in the state of Louisiana as a scholar, a writer, an orator and a jurist.  He earned his diploma by patient industry, with a fertile brain. (4)

Paul Pujo died in 1883 and Arsene became administrator of the family estate.  As administrator, he developed an interest in law. (5)  He read law in the offices of Gabriel A. Fournet, a Lake Charles attorney, and was admitted to the Louisiana bar before the state supreme court October 23, 1886.  He immediately began practice in Lake Charles. (6)

Pujo began building a home on the northwest corner of Bilbo and Mill streets in Lake Charles in October, 1889.  On December 16, 1889, he married Gussie Brown of Orange, Texas in the Presbyterian church of that city.  Gussie Brown was the daughter of Dr. Samuel Moore Brown.  The couple moved into their new home on December 25, 1889. (7)  Later accounts described the home as a mansion when compared with most homes of its time.  The Pujo home was a Lake Charles landmark until it was demolished about 1947. (8)

Two daughters, Elaine and Mona, were born to the Pujo's.  (9)  The family traveled frequently, spending a considerable amount of their travel time in New Orleans.  The summer of 1896 was spent in Colorado Springs, Colorado.  Pujo’s interest in national politics was awakened on the Colorado journey judging from a newspaper account which said on his return to Lake Charles that he was “fully convinced that Bryan and the Chicago platform are right, and should be elected by the American people.” (10)  Although the family traveled extensively, they were not active in the social affairs of Lake Charles until after Pujo was elected to Congress in 1902. (11)   Pujo did become a member of the Boston Club in New Orleans. (12)  He was a member of the Roman Catholic Church.

Arsene, unlike his father, was not a quiet, unassuming man.  One account describes him as “a man of strong will and resolute character, always dominating every situation by his personality and ability.” (13)   A well-built and decidedly handsome man, he was described, at age fifty-one, as dark haired and mustached.  He was five feet, nine inches in height. (14)  A law partner said he was quick-minded, legally adept and a charming man personally.  In describing Pujo’s personality, the partner remarked:

He had a nice little habit I’ve always appreciated.  He had three offices and mine was next to the hallway.  He always stopped in and chatted awhile.  He always had something historical or amusing to relate.  I looked forward to his chats. (15)
 

Hunting was his favorite pastime and he was a member of the first gun club in Lake Charles. (16)  His law partner said, “He was a fine quail, snipe, and woodcock shot and carried a shotgun with the stock sawed off.  He used the gun like a pistol. (17)

Pujo formed his first law partnership with his former tutor, Fournet, and the firm of Fournet and Pujo continued until 1892.  In that year, Fournet was elected judge of the Twelfth Judicial District of Louisiana.  Calcasieu, Cameron, and Vernon parishes made up the Twelfth District at that time.  Pujo had been offered the judgeship nomination because his active participation in the fight against the Louisiana State Lottery, but declined in favor of his law partner and former teacher. (18)  During a lifetime of legal practice, Pujo had formed legal partnerships with Clem D. Moss, E. D. Miller, Leon Sugar, W. B. Williamson, C. R. Liskow, and U. A. Bell.  From 1930 until the time of his death, he was the senior member of the firm of Pujo, C. E. Hardin, and Thomas F. Porter. (19)
 

As a lawyer, Pujo was highly regarded by members of his profession.  C. A. McCoy, in a eulogy during a memory service for Pujo at a formal session of the Fourteenth Judicial District Court, said of Pujo:

Mr. Pujo was a lawyer of unusual ability, eminently successful and in public matters at all times frank and open in supporting what he thought was right or condemning that which he thought was wrong; and tolerant toward the views of others. (20)
 

Another lawyer said, “Younger members of the local bar had lost in Mr. Pujo an excellent adviser.”  Presiding Judge Mark C. Pickrel said, "There is no better trial lawyer in this court than Mr. Pujo nor any more courteous." (21) Others described him as one who could impress others with his views and captivate them by the force of his logic and his store of information.  Once acquainted with the law, he never forgot it.  He never let a client tell him how to conduct a case but instead inspired confidence in those who sought his advice. (22)

Numerous trips taken by Pujo for legal purposes were an indication of a large and lucrative practice.  He made trips to New Orleans for Supreme Court cases and to Alexandria, Louisiana for United States District Court suits.  (23)  Such a large practice caused criticism during the congressional campaigns, a criticism to be discussed in Chapter IV.

During a time when Lake Charles was in the throes of growth and expansion, Pujo was associated with many of the initial movements indicating the city was to develop into an active Louisiana community.  Lake Charles was, as it presently is, the parish seat of Calcasieu Parish.  In 1896 Calcasieu Parish was the largest parish, territorially, in the state.  Its area stretched sixty miles from east to west and seventy miles from north to south.  In addition to Lake Charles, the principal parish towns in 1896 were Jennings, Roanoak (sic), Welsh, Iowa, and Westlake. (24)

An early office held by Pujo in Lake Charles was that of president of the Lake Charles Steam Engine Company No. 1. (25)  Pujo’s interest in the growth of Lake Charles was evidenced in his association with the Lake Charles Board of Trade.  Although the railroad was coming into its own in the Calcasieu and Southwestern Louisiana community, waterways continued to occupy the time and efforts of Lake Charles leaders. (26)  The Board of Trade was the primary group identified with the progressive steps being taken to improve commercial conditions in Lake Charles area.  Pujo was a charter member of the board.  Being a man of letters, he was often asked to handle correspondence for the board.  During April of 1896, a Senate committee in Washington removed all but one harbor improvement in Louisiana from the continuous appropriation system.  Plaquemines Parish was to be the favored area.  A letter from the Board of Trade to Louisiana Senator Don Caffery protested the action of the Senate committee and viewed the committee’s decision as one of serious consequences to not only Lake Charles, but  to the Southwest Louisiana area as well.
 

Subsidies had been voted by Lake Charles to secure an additional railroad from the northwestern part of the state, a plan which was felt would bring the commerce of several states valued at millions of dollars to the Gulf Coast area.  The Board of Trade feared that failure to continue river and harbor improvements on the Calcasieu River would result in commerce finding its way to Texas outlets on the Gulf of Mexico.  Louisiana Senator Andrew Price wired Pujo in behalf of the Board stating he would attempt to have the Senate committee put the appropriation for Calcasieu Parish back into the bill.  On April 27, again in a wire to Pujo, Price said the Senate committee had decided to leave Calcasieu on the contract system. (27)   Pujo’s role in Board of Trade affairs continued until 1903, the year be began his first term in Congress. (28)   His interest in Board of Trade activities did not come to an end, however, because waterway improvement and commercial affairs were paramount in his program of legislation.

Civic betterment groups mushroomed in Lake Charles and in 1897 the Commercial Club was organized to “push the city forward.”  Pujo joined the club and was appointed to the executive committee.  His ability at organization, a characteristic demonstrated on future occasions, was obviously, known to and appreciated by Lake Charles citizens. (29)

Also in 1897, Lake Charles citizens met to plan a Calcasieu Parish fair.  An indication of the value of Pujo’s thinking to the community is found in a newspaper article which said:

Hon. A. P. Pujo was then called upon to state the object of the meeting.

Mr. Pujo said that they had made a mistake in calling on him to state the object of the meeting, as he knew nothing about it other than it was called for the purpose of considering the holding of a fair here; but that he was heartily in favor of the movement. (30) 

Pujo was named to a twelve-man organizational committee and at a subsequent meeting of the group, he was asked to prepare a charter for the fair association.  He outlined the essential elements of the charter which conformed to charter provisions of the laws of the state.  The following evening the charter of the Calcasieu Fair Association was adopted. (31)

In these early years of growth, Lake Charles lacked hospital facilities and number of interested citizens were interested in determining the feasibility of establishing a city hospital.  As had been done on similar occasions, the interested persons gathered at the parish courthouse to determine a means of financing the proposal.  Pujo attended the initial meeting and was one of fifteen men appointed to a committee to consider ways and means of financing the project.  The committee later recommended that subcommittees be formed to begin solicitation of the necessary funds.  About $5,000 was thought to be sufficient to operate the hospital for one year.  Although contributions had been pledged, the hospital project languished and finally died in 1905. (32)  A similar, but separate, proposal was a plan to build a sanitarium for the city.  Pujo was a member of the board of trustees of the planned sanitarium, but resigned his position in 1906 because he was away from the city often during the years he was a congressman.  A short time later, the proposed sanitarium plans were abandoned. (33)

Progressive members of the Lake Charles Community were delighted in 1899 when Pujo was appointed as a delegate from Louisiana to the Western Waterways convention in Memphis.  A newspaper account said “the people of Lake Charles will be glad to know that the governor has recognized Mr. Pujo as eminently able to care for them (waterways).” (34)  About 1,500 delegates attended the convention to discuss internal waterways and to determine means of waterway improvement.  Pujo was named a member of a committee to organize a permanent waterways organization.  Lake Charles received word on November 16 that the convention had adopted a resolution introduced by Pujo which urged the further improvement of Calcasieu Pass and River under the continuous contract system.  Endorsement of the convention was believed to carry considerable influence with Washington officials. (35)          

While in Memphis, the Louisiana delegates formed a temporary state waterways association and steps were taken to plan the organization of a state waterways group.  A state organizational meeting was planned for New Orleans.  The New Orleans meeting was held December 18, 1899, and Pujo was one of twelve delegates from Lake Charles.  Again, evidencing an aptitude for organization, Pujo was named to the committee on permanent organization of the state association.  And he was selected a member-at-large of the executive committee to guide the organization along with the newly-elected officers. (36)

Community betterment was the goal of Lake Charles citizens when in 1899 purchase of the Lake Charles Light and Waterworks Company was planned by the city.  As a member of the franchise committee, Pujo was active in bargaining with the company to close the terms of the purchase.  A price of $85,000 was suggested by the company and bargaining began. Circulation of a petition was the means whereby the citizens of Lake Charles registered their approval or disapproval of the proposed purchase. The waterworks company caused opposition to the purchase in September 1899, when it raised the price of installation to $100,000.  Added improvements to the plant were cited as the reason for the increase.  At a city council meeting in November, Pujo remarked that there was considerable lethargy about the waterworks petition.  Finally, on November 15 all negotiations with the company were cancelled. (37)

Andrew Carnegie’s philanthropic enterprises had their impact in Lake Charles and, as in other cities throughout the country, a Carnegie library was planned for the city.  Pujo was chosen a member of the board of trustees for the planned library.  The library opened March 7, 1904. (38)

Banking and finance, two personal interests of Pujo, were to occupy much of his time, not only locally, but on the national level.  His adeptness in finance on the national level will be discussed in later chapters. In 1903, Pujo was elected president of the First National Bank of Welsh, Louisiana, an office to which he was renamed the following year.  He was also a director of the First National Bank of Lake Charles for a number of years and was employed by the bank as legal counsel.  The Lake Charles bank is the oldest in Southwest Louisiana. (39)

One of Pujo’s chores as civic leader following his election to Congress was to serve as guide and host for official visits to Lake Charles and the surrounding area, and to preside over opening ceremonies of new installations. He served as official greeter for an agriculture institute in the city in 1903 and a newspaper account said, “Congressman A. P. Pujo greeted the distinguished visitors in one of his happy little addresses.” (40)

Community projects of lesser importance then those already indicated merited the attentions of Pujo.  He attended a meeting to plan a sewerage system for Lake Charles in 1906 when plans were made to determine the type of system the city needed. (41)  In 1903, then he was a delegate to the Interstate Levee Association meeting in New Orleans. (42)  Contributions were made by him or his law firm to the Women’s Christian Temperance Union Library in Lake Charles, the proposed city hospital, the Galveston Relief Fund in 1900, and a public school fund in 1908. (43)

Participation by Pujo in affairs of Lake Charles and the surrounding community were but a prelude to his involvement in affairs of the state and nation.  While engaged in numerous civic activities, he was at the same time participating in some of the political affairs for which he is remembered.  These early civic interests, however, helped to foster in Pujo those qualities that would be called forth when he broadened and multiplied his interests.  

CHAPTER II

PUJO AND LOUISIANA POLITICS

Arsene Pujo was not a professional politician.  It would be more accurate to say he was both a professional man and a politician.  During a life time of political interest and activity, he continued his legal practice in Lake Charles, and when faced with the opportunity early in life to accept, or at least to vie for political renown, he chose to devote his energies to legal pursuits.  And when he retired from his congressional post in 1913, he cited pressing professional duties as his primary reason for stepping down.  However, when he held public office and when political affairs gained his attention, he devoted his full energies to those affairs.  It will be the purpose of this chapter to discuss Pujo’s early political background, tracing those interests to the beginning of what was to be his major political achievement, that of serving as congressman from the Seventh Congressional District of Louisiana from 1903 to 1913. 

The outspoken quality which evoked admiration for Pujo in the legal sphere was also characteristic of his years in politics.  A resolution honoring his memory said of his political interests:

In his political activities from the time he enlisted in the crusade against renewing the charter of the Louisiana lottery in the memorable campaigns of 1888 and 1892 until his death, he never hesitated to make known his position on any political question, and always stood for improvement of political conditions, either local, state or national. (1)

A faithful member of the Democratic Party, he was not only a true member of the party, but he believed political parties were essential to progress  in city, state, and nation.  A newspaper interview in 1907 indicated Pujo’s firm party allegiance when he said:  

Our national and state governments are conducted by parties - republican or democratic.  This is also true of all municipalities of any importance. 
 

Party nominations and party governments usually give the best results.  The party in power is held to strict accountability by the people.  Should its administration be incapable or corrupt it is ousted from control.
 

Reformers and independents represent merely the political whims of the moment.
 

It is a misnomer for persons to designate themselves as independent democrats or independent republicans.  In neither case do they belong to either party.  They are independents, considering themselves free from party obligations and party nominations unless approved by them. (2)

During his lifetime, Pujo was associated with city, parish, district, state, and national organizations of the Democratic Party. 

His earliest interest in politics and involvement in Democratic Party affairs is found in his association with the Nicholls Club of Lake Charles in 1887, less than a year after he was admitted to the Louisiana bar.  Ex-governor Francis T. Nicholls was touring the state that year, promoting his candidacy for the 1888 gubernatorial nomination.  Pujo was a member of the finance committee of the local Nicholls Club, and he was on the reception committee that welcomed Nicholls to Lake Charles on his state tour.  He was also a member of the Calcasieu Parish committee which sponsored a resolution pledging support of Nicholls when the Democratic State Convention met to name a candidate for governor.  When the convention met in Baton Rouge, January 10, 1888, Nicholls was nominated over the incumbent, Governor Samuel D. McEnery. (3)

Pujo’s endorsement of Nicholls was the beginning of a series of endorsements in which he supported successful candidates for the state Democratic nomination for governor.  Nicholls was elected in 1888, and in 1892 and 1896, Pujo backed the successful candidate for nomination, Murphy J. Foster.  He supported Newton C. Blanchard in 1904, and Blanchard was nominated.  Pujo made a number of speeches in behalf of Blanchard, and was on the arrangement committee for the Lake Charles Blanchard Committee.  The successful nominee in 1908, Jared Y. Sanders, received Pujo’s support; in 1912, he supported the nomination of Judge Luther E. Hall, candidate of the Good Government League of Louisiana. (4)  In presidential campaigns, however, Pujo did not meet with the same success, for he supported William Jennings Bryan in his unsuccessful bids for the presidency. He was named a member of the Bryan Advisory Committee from the state of Louisiana in 1908, spoke for Bryan in the Seventh Congressional District, and donated one hundred dollars to the Bryan Campaign Fund.  In 1912, Pujo was a Champ Clark supportee, and his candidate was defeated for the Democratic Party nomination by Woodrow Wilson. (5)

The initial party role for which Pujo was to be remembered during his lifetime, however, was his participation in the Anti-Lottery Campaigns of 1888 and 1892.  The Louisiana State Lottery Company, “destined to be the most famous, or infamous, in the history of such ventures,” was licensed to operate in Louisiana by the legislature of 1868.  Although company headquarters were in Louisiana, the company operated throughout the United State, receiving ninety per cent of its proceeds from without the state.  Proponents of the lottery justified its existence on the basis of revenue it produced for the state, and claimed it kept gambling funds from being lost to other states.  Opponents attacked the lottery, claiming the institution fostered corrupt practices in government; odds were said to be so high, and prices so low people who could not afford to gamble were the very ones who were encouraged to “take their chances.”  The company faced a critical period in 1879 when the legislature revoked the company charter, but retaliated by applying for an injunction from the United States Circuit Court to prohibit the state’s action.  The injunction was granted, but, fearing a reversal in a higher court, the company decided its best chances lay with the constitutional convention then in session.  Debate on the lottery took eight days in the convention, and the company emerged the victor when Article CLXVII of the new constitution provided the company would be tolerated until 1894.

Although the company had gained approval in Louisiana, many states passed laws outlawing the lottery in those states.  Each Louisiana legislature was involved in the lottery question, and by 1890, the lottery became a “burning issue” in the state.  The lottery company had been courting popular favor in the state with its charitable grants, and in 1890 one million dollars was offered the state for a new charter. S. O. Shattuck, member of the Louisiana House of Representatives from Calcasieu Parish, in 1890 introduced a bill providing for submission of the lottery question to the people of the state in the form of an amendment to the state constitution.  Shattuck, in a personal interview in 1928, said he was opposed to lotteries, but he believed the people should decide if the company charter was to be renewed.  The Shattuck measure, House Bill 214, passed both the House and Senate with the exact two-thirds vote required, but Governor Nicholls vetoed the bill.  His veto was overridden, leaving the final choice of renewing the lottery license to the electorate.  The amendment was to be submitted to the voters in the general election for state officials in 1892.  Passage of the Shattuck Bill was the signal for dissident elements in the state to organize in opposition to the renewal of the lottery charter and defeat of the amendment. (6)
 

On February 28, 1890, the Anti-Lottery League was formed in New Orleans, holding its first public meeting in the city in April, 1890.  Proponents of the lottery responded to the Anti-Lottery League by forming the Progressive League, an organization designed to promote continuance of the lottery.  A description of the situation in 1891 stated:

Take all men in Louisiana who are opposed to Lotteries, whether rated by character, ability, acquirements, property, family or social position, and they can be matched, man for man, in every characteristic of excellence, from the friends of the lottery amendment. (7)

Almost all of the press in the state supported the lottery along with those who felt the financial assistance of the company was necessary.  The big New Orleans banks were said to favor the company, and most Negroes were in favor of its continuance.  The ranks of the Anti-Lottery League were swelled with clergymen and persons who believed the lottery was responsible for many political and moral evils pervading the state.  On both sides were found those individuals who felt their stand on the matter would be beneficial to them politically. (8)          

The Anti-Lottery League held an organizational convention in Baton Rouge on August 7, 1890, 956 delegates attending from fifty-three parishes in the state.  Pujo was a delegate to the convention, being listed as “N. P. Pujol (sic),” a member of the Committee on Credentials from the Third District. (9)  As was the case often in these early years, Pujo’s name was frequently misspelled or confused with the Pujol name of New Orleans.  A biographical sketch of Pujo appearing in the New York Sun in 1913 attributed Pujo’s early prominence in the state to his participation in the Anti-Lottery League.  The Sun said:

The lottery was really a very popular institution, and in those days, to be in the forefront of opposition to it was not conducive to political success.  It might even be bad for the law business to assume such an attitude.  But Mr. Pujo has never been a seeker of popularity. (10)

Anti-Lottery activities received added impetus in August, 1891 when the League and State Farmers Union agreed to unite in opposition to the lottery.  It was agreed that Thomas Scott Adams, state president of the Farmers Union, was to be nominated for governor by the combine at the Democratic State Convention. (11)  The Democratic State Central Committee met at Baton Rouge on December 15, 1891, and Pujo participated in the meeting, holding a proxy for G. A. Fournet, Calcasieu member of the state group. (12)  The committee made plans for the state convention which convened December 16.  Pro and anti-lottery differences at the convention resulted in the division of the party into two convention camps.  Pujo was certified as a delegate to the Anti-Lottery-Farmers Union faction which met in the State-house in Baton Rouge on December 17.  Adams was nominated by acclamation for governor, but to the amazement of the delegates, he declined the nomination.  Murphy J. Foster, an Anti-Lottery League sugar planter, was then nominated for governor by the anti faction; Pujo was one of seven delegates to second the Foster nomination. (13) Meanwhile the pro faction nominated Samuel D. McEnery for governor. (14)   Even the Republican Party was divided over the lottery issue, the pros supporting Albert Leonard for governor, and the antis backing John A. Breaux.   A Populist Party candidate was also in the gubernatorial race.  The stage was now set for the 1892 state election. 

Results of the primary held March 22, 1892, by the Democrats were so close that both McEnery and Foster claimed the victory.  Although the election committee said Foster had won, McEnery refused to abide by its decision and entered a general election in April, 1892.  Foster defeated McEnery and the other three candidates by a decisive plurality in the April election; in addition, the lottery amendment was defeated by a vote of 4,225 for and 157,422 against.  The final blow to the company came when the 1892 legislature passed a bill prohibiting lottery tickets sales after December 31, 1892. (15)

Pujo and Fournet were the only two members of the Calcasieu community to be cited for their active roles in the anti-lottery movement. (16) As already noted, Pujo was offered the nomination for district judge by the Anti-Lottery League, but declined in favor of Fournet.  Apparently satisfied with Foster’s administration, Pujo in 1896 became a member of the “Foster Democratic Club of Calcasieu Parish.”  He was a member of the campaign and reception committees of the club, and he served as the club’s secretary pro tem. (17)
 

Democratic Party activities in the congressional district next occupied Pujo’s attention. A democratic convention was held in the Third Congressional District in 1889 for the purpose of naming a successor to E. J. Gay, district congressman who died in office.  Pujo served as temporary secretary for the convention which nominated Andrew Price as Gay’s replacement.  Pujo was active again in district affairs when he toured the district “in interest of the free silver, Bryan and congressional tickets’ in 1896. (18)
 

There was no doubt about the primary reason for calling the convention.  As a New Orleans daily newspaper remarked on opening day of the convention: 

To-day at noon the seventh constitutional convention of the state of Louisiana will ….take the initiatory steps towards reforming the suffrage of the state so as to eliminate the ignorant and vicious elements and to wipe out the stain on civilization enacted by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. (21) 

Pujo was a member of the patronage committee of Democratic caucus from the Third District.  After the committee on rules and organization reported on what official staff would be necessary, the patronage committee was designated to equally distribute the clerical patronage between the six districts of the state. (22)  In the early days of the convention, Pujo was named a member of the judiciary committee.  The judiciary committee assigned to subcommittees the task of drawing substitute ordinances to be presented to the delegates.  Pujo was appointed to the Judiciary System for the Country Parishes Subcommittee; a group assigned the task of revising the judicial elements of the constitution of 1879.  The final draft of many important amendments was the work of Pujo and Judge Frank A. Monroe of New Orleans, chairman of the subcommittee. (23)  Pujo was the author of the change in the constitution requiring sessions of court to last as long as cases were up for hearing and the provision allowing trial of misdemeanor cases without a jury. (24)  Other committees to which Pujo was assigned were the Limitations and Apportionment committees. (25)

Pujo introduced three ordinances at the convention, none of which were adopted in their original form.  One dealt with the election of sheriff and coroner and was reported without action on May 11, 1898. Creation of the office of tax collector for the parishes was the substance of the second ordinance introduced by Pujo, but it was reported by substitute and in the final draft of the constitution, the sheriff remained the ex-officio tax collector of state and parish taxes. (26)  In an appearance before the committee on taxation, Pujo showed that:

 .…the function of tax collection was entirely foreign to the duties of the sheriff.  The ordinance (Pujo’s) provides the payment of 5 percent on the first $40,000, the percentage decreasing as the sum increased.  His purpose was to discourage “the profession of office holding.”   He sees no reason why men possessing often very limited abilities should be receiving from the state higher compensation that the supreme justices. (27)

The final ordinance sponsored by Pujo provided for resting juries with authority to assess punishment in criminal cases.  This was also reported without action on May 11. (28)

Private measures introduced by Pujo were not the primary role played by him at the convention.   Of vital concern to many delegates was the adoption of a suffrage provision in the constitution which would preserve the doctrine of “White Supremacy.”  The earliest suffrage proposal introduced to the delegates would have permitted everyone who voted in 1897 to vote as long as they live, and then establish educational and property qualifications from that point.  Pujo objected to the plan on the grounds nothing could be gained from the proposal.  He said that only 72,000 whites and about 11.000 Negroes were registered to vote in 1897; with 110,000 white voters in the state, 20,000 to 25,000 of whom could not read or write, he maintained that only a small percentage of those illiterate whites would be allowed to vote under the proposal. (29)  A preliminary report from the suffrage committee provided:

No person who was Jan. 1 1868 or at any time prior thereto entitled to vote and no legitimate male descendant of any such person shall be denied the right to register and vote by reason of his failure to possess the educational or property qualifications prescribed by this constitution. (30)

         
This was to be the proposal on which the final suffrage provision was modeled.  The proceedings were going rather smoothly until some of the delegates decided a poll tax feature should be incorporated into the suffrage provisions of the constitution. 

It was at this point that Pujo came into prominence at the convention for he was chairman of the group of delegates who favored the poll tax plan. (31)  Plans called for use of poll tax receipts in the individual parishes for support of public education.  After weeks of indecision, the suffrage provisions of the constitution ware finally adopted.  In final form, the provisions stated that all persons twenty-one years of age or over possessing the following qualifications would be allowed to vote:

1.     Resident of the state for two years, the parish for one year, and the voting precinct for six months.

2.     Legally registered.

3.     Able to read and write in the English or mother tongue.

4.     Owner of property assessed at not less than three hundred dollars.

Section 5 of the constitution, which has come to be known as the “grandfather clause.”  Stated:

No male person who was on Jan. 1, 1867, or any date prior thereto entitled to vote, and no son or grandson of any such person not less than 21, and no foreign born male naturalized prior to Jan. 1, 1898 shall be denied the right to vote by reason or failure to possess the educational and property qualifications prescribed. (32)

Pujo’s poll tax committee was successful in having the poll tax feature incorporated into the constitution, for Article 198 said that no person under sixty years of age would be allowed to vote, if, if in addition to the above qualifications, he had not paid a poll tax amounting to one dollar per year. (33)  Some delegates expressed concern over the constitutionality of the suffrage provisions; however, Pujo urged the adoption of the provisions and voted for them, the vote being eighty-five to forty-five in favor of their adoption. (34)

Delegates paused midway in the convention to welcome William Jennings Bryan to New Orleans.  Pujo was selected a member of the welcoming committee which went by train to meet Bryan and escort him to the city.  During his brief visit to New Orleans, Bryan visited Tulane Hall and spoke to the convention; his speech was well received by the delegates. (35)

Establishment of the state railroad commission was a second major consideration of the convention.  Pujo made an unsuccessful attempt to include watercraft under the supervision of the commission when those watercraft were used in conjunction with a railroad.  When the final vote on the establishment of the commission was taken, it passed eighty-three to forty-six, Pujo voting in favor of its adoption. (36)  Pujo was lauded for his efforts in establishment of the commission, a supervisory body that later became the Public Service Commission. (37)

Pujo voiced his opinion on a number of matters which came before the judiciary committee in its sessions during the convention.  He said he favored the abolition of justices of the peace and allowing police jurors to issue warrants.  He said he preferred the establishment of smaller district courts with the authority to try small cases without the intervention of a jury, a provision which in part was adopted by the convention.  Smaller districts were preferable, he said, because a man with a small claim would get the same kind of justice as a man with a large claim. (38)

The constitutional convention completed its work at 11:45 P.M. on May 12, 1898, and all but two delegates signed the final draft of the constitution. (39)  The satisfaction felt by many delegates may be found in the closing remarks of Ernest Kruttschnitt, president of the convention, who said:

May this hall where, thirty-two years ago, the negro first entered upon the unequal contest for supremacy, and which has been reddened with his blood,  now witness the evolution of our organic law which will establish the relations between the races upon and everlasting foundation of right and justice. (40)

This satisfaction, however, was not as pronounced in other quarters; twelve of the state’s newspapers were very critical of the convention while only four were said to approve of the work of the assembly.  One newspaper, quoting the Shreveport Evening Journal, remarked:

The Shreveport Evening Journal thus commences an elegy on this body:  The Constitutional Convention is about to draw its last breath, and would that it could be buried and forgotten. (41)

Parish Democratic affairs were to occupy much of Pujo’s time in 1889 and 1900.  He presided over a forum of candidates who were vying for district, parish, and ward offices in November of 1899.  Delegates to a parish convention, who in turn were to select eight delegates to the state convention, were also to be named in the parish primary. (42)  Adding unusual interest to the election was the fact that, for the first time in a Calcasieu Parish election, the direct primary method was to be used.  In an interview in New Orleans following the primary, Pujo praised its success, saying:

On last Saturday the first primary election for the selection of the parish nominees was held in Calcasieu Parish.  This was the parish that the old nominating convention had not held say.

The primary was a complete success, and the people were pleased with the plan. The nominees, in my opinion, will receive the solid support of the Calcasieu democratic voters and that demonstrated the success of the scheme. (43)
 

Pujo’s participation in parish Democratic affairs helped to broaden his interest and he became an active worker in the party at the state level.  During a Democratic State Executive Committee meeting in 1900, he fought a resolution which would have permitted the executive committee to fill vacancies on the state ticket.  The resolution was introduced because some committee members felt it might be difficult to get all of the central committee together in a short time.  Pujo contended the committee could be summoned in twenty-four hours, but in spite of his opposition, the resolution passed. (44)  In May, 1900, Pujo was appointed a delegate to the Democratic State Convention which was to meet in Baton Rouge, June 4.  Following the convention, a Lake Charles newspaper editorially praised Pujo’s participation in convention sessions.  The paper remarked:

There is some sort of mistake regarding an incident of the state convention which ought to be cleared up.  One of the members of the committee on resolutions made a strong protest against the endorsement of the Chicago platform as a whole, because of this attack upon the Supreme Court.  The New Orleans papers refer to him as Mr. Pujo and evidently assume that it is one of the ward statesmen from New Orleans.  Our understanding is that it was Hon. A. P. Pujo, one of the delegates from Calcasieu.  Whenever a Calcasieu man gets up and talks out in meeting, no matter whether what he says is agreeable to us or not, we protest that full credit should be accorded to the parish.  Most of the delegates to the state convention seem to be too much scared to say anything. (45)

Pujo, along with Jared Y. Sanders, was a member of the Committee on Resolutions from the Third District at the June convention. (46)

The first hint that Pujo might be a possible candidate for Congress appeared in the Lake Charles Daily American in July, 1900.  The editorial in which it appeared stated Calcasieu Parish might be better off with a Republican congressman since the method of fixing representation in the Third District seemed to insure the renomination of the incumbent, R. F. Broussard.  Pujo and H. C. Drew were mentioned as possible congressional candidates, but neither was reportedly ready to oppose Broussard. The editor complained that, because of the way representation had been set, the eastern part of the district had control of the entire district. (47)  There had been some talk in 1899 that Pujo might be a candidate for attorney general of Louisiana, but at that time he said he was not ready to enter political life and did not want to neglect his business interests in Lake Charles. (48)  In 1901, he was again in the public eye as a possible replacement for a vacancy on the Louisiana Supreme Court.  The Lake Charles and Calcasieu bar associations were advocating his ability to fill the position, but nothing came of his appointment. (49)

Not only was Pujo a loyal member of the Democratic Party, but he was constantly associated with individual and group movements to improve the democratic system of government.  Following his announcement for Congress, he was asked to give his views on the direct primary.  He said:

I have given the matter careful consideration and study, and am unqualifiedly in favor of a white democratic primary throughout the district, the majority of all votes cast to nominate.  Should one fail to receive a majority, then drop all candidates except the two highest, and let those two settle it at a second primary.
 

A nomination by primaries is strictly democratic and is founded upon the right of the people to select those who desire political advancement at their hands.  The voters in a contest of that kind will have the opportunity of meeting the candidates face to face; of hearing him state his views on public questions, and of determining for themselves whether he is entitled to support.   The primary system will awaken interest in every voter, and thereby bring him in closer touch with his representatives and his government, thus guaranteeing its perpetuity.

If a candidate cannot win a primary within his own party, held under rules and regulations guaranteeing its absolute fairness, why then he ought to stay at home.  It is true it will be an arduous campaign and during a trying time of the year, but judging from the number mentioned, the people will have no trouble in finding some one willing to serve them. (50)

This election of 1902 was the first time the primary method was used to nominate candidates for a congressional post in the district. (51)  Showing a complete understanding of workings of a district primary, Pujo, at a Democratic State Central Committee meeting in New Orleans in 1903, made a motion to strike out the word election after primary, saying, “he did not consider a primary an election, and the use of the word had led to confusion.”  He received no second on his motion and the matter was dropped. (52)

Pujo again evidenced a strong belief in the primary method prior to his attendance at a state committee meeting in September, 1903, when he said he favored a primary for nomination of state officials.  By unanimous vote at the September meeting, the committee approved a resolution providing for election of state officials and United States senators by direct primary.  A second primary was planned to the top two candidates for each post in the event no one candidate received a majority.  During the meeting, Pujo was appointed to a committee on rules to formulate policies for the government of the general state primary. (53)  At a sub-committee meeting later, Pujo was successful in leading opposition to indiscriminate distribution of “tickets” and open voting as provided in statutes framed for the state election. (54) New Orleans ward leaders and some country members were said to be opposed to any measure of privacy in voting. (55)  Democratic Party participation by Pujo broadened in scope following his election to Congress.  He was named a delegate to the state nominating conventions in 1904, 1908, and 1912.  Stopping over from Washington for the 1908 convention, he was elected alternate-at-large to the Democratic National Convention to be held in Denver the same year.  At the state convention in 1912, he was named a delegate to the national convention in Baltimore. (56)   The top recognition Pujo would receive as a Democratic Party worker was his election to the post of Democratic National Committeeman from Louisiana in October, 1919.  He held this post until June 4, 1920. (57)

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY YEARS IN CONGRESS, 1903 - 1907

I will be a candidate for Congress in the Seventh Congressional District, subject to the wishes of the people of Calcasieu parish to be expressed in democratic primaries or convention. (1)

Arsene Pujo made this announcement in 1902 after years of civic and public service on the local and state levels.  First mentioned as a possible congressional candidate in 1900, he was reported as not ready then to oppose R. F. Broussard, congressman from the Third Congressional District of which Calcasieu Parish was a part. (2)   But the United States Census of 1900 altered the situation.  Louisiana in the last decade had gained population so as to be entitled to an additional representative in Congress.  An apportionment bill for Louisiana passed Congress in 1901, and the following year the state general assembly created the new Seventh Congressional District composed of Acadia, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Grant, Rapides, St. Landry and Vernon parishes. (3)   Pujo was not the only Calcasieu Parish aspirant for election to the House of Representatives. State Senator Harrison C. Drew announced his candidacy July 17, 1902, and two days later W. B. Norris filed. (4) William Polk and Judge W. F. Blackman, both of Rapides Parish, indicated they would be candidates for the newly created post, and R. Lee Garland of St. Landry Parish completed the list of candidates for the Democratic Party nomination for Congress. (5)  Since the congressional post was new and since, once elected, Louisiana congressmen are hard to defeat, the 1902 congressional election in the Seventh District was of special importance.

For years, Calcasieu Parish had hoped a native son would someday be elected to Congress; events of 1902 illustrated this longing.  Drew withdrew his candidacy in July, and Norris withdrew in August. (6)  News accounts in both instances stated they had withdrawn so the interests of the parish could be concentrated on one man.  An editorial the day preceding the election remarked:

Tomorrow the democrats of the seventh congressional district select a candidate for congressmen by the primary method.  Of the many candidates talked of, four have stayed in the race.
 

One of these candidates is Hon. A. P. Pujo, of Calcasieu parish.  For a long time, Calcasieu has looked longingly toward Washington and wished that one of her sons might fill the coveted seat.  Well, the opportunity is now here.  She has a candidate whose reputation is district-wide and who will command support from every parish in the district. She has but one candidate, so that here her energies need not be wasted and her opportunity imperiled.
 

A full vote from the empire parish tomorrow will put Mr. Pujo in a position to win.  There is not one valid reason why he should not command the full support of his party.  The man has enemies of course - every man, worthy of consideration has them.  If it were a question of Mr. Pujo personally, some of them might vote against him, though that would be a rather unsatisfactory sort of revenge, after all.  
 

But it is not a question of Mr. Pujo at all.  The question is, will you vote for a congressman from Calcasieu parish?  We have all agreed that Calcasieu should have a congressman.  Senator H. C. Drew and Capt. W. B. Norris, popular democratic leaders and loyal Calcasieu men, both of them, retired from the race in order that Calcasieu’s chance might not be lost…(7)  

The Seventh Congressional Democratic Committee met in Opelousas in August and voted to use the direct primary method for the first time to nominate the congressional candidate for the party. (8)  As noted in Chapter II, Pujo favored the primary method and his first candidacy for a major political office was to be decided by that method.  The district committee set September 11, 1902, as the date for the primary and ruled that any registered voter who was a member of the Democratic Party could participate.  A majority vote was necessary for nomination and a second primary would be held in the event no candidate received a majority. (9)

Pujo’s newspaper support came primarily from the Lake Charles Daily American, although he was also endorsed by the Vernon News of Leesville and the Rayne Tribune. (10)  The Daily American campaigned for him editorially and in news stories relating to the Election.  Since Pujo lacked political experience on the national scene, his friends and supporters stressed his personal qualities and his past participation in Democratic Party activities.  He was portrayed as a loyal Democrat, always abiding by the wishes of the party.  He was said to be thoroughly acquainted with the interests and industries of the Seventh District and possessed the courage and perseverance to fight for the needs of the district.  One account said he was conservative, though willing to change his views when his judgment dictated. (11)

Although Pujo traveled throughout the district, much of his campaign centered upon Lake Charles.  He had already advocated his belief in the direct primary, and Polk, on a trip to Lake Charles, did the same.  While in Lake Charles, Polk stressed the need for farmers having representation in Congress, saying labor and capital were already represented.  He said some people thought only lawyers could make the laws.  While in the city, Polk stated that he favored a tariff on lumber, rice, and sugar, three of the principal industries of the Seventh District. (12)

Blackman, the other candidate from Rapides, exuded confidence when he came to Lake Charles, saying that not only would he carry his home parish of Rapides, but “I will get practically the solid vote of Grant, and I believe I will carry Avoyelles and Vernon.”  He was sure he would be a second primary candidate. (13) The Opelousas Courier indicated that he was as confident when he spoke in that city. (14)  Garland, as will be noted later, was probably more vocal about his candidacy following the primary.  A news story August 23, 1902, said Garland would have a “rocky road” in his own parish of St. Landry. (15)  A Courier news story said of Garland:

The Clarion (another Opelousas paper) is begging the readers to vote for Mr. Lee Garland for Congress.  The Clarion has always plumed itself upon being a champion of Democracy and white supremacy.  The distinguishing feature of Mr. Garland’s brief political career has been his strenuous and more or less successful opposition to the political creed, the men and measures for which the Clarion stood… With the negro as an important factor in our political degeneracy of our people had become appalling, but we do not believe it had ever become as bad as that. (16)

Pujo, in a campaign address at Crowley, expressed his views on three major issues:  anti-imperialism, tariff, and trust.  A news account of his speech reported:

Mr. Pujo then directed his attention to the departure on the part of the Declaration of Independence and claimed that the maxim, that “all governments instituted among men derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” had been emasculated from that instrument by the republican party in its intention and control of the Philippine Islands.  (17)

He opposed control of the Philippines on the grounds that the islands were six thousand miles from the United States and that the ten million people there were “a race of Asiatics, foreign to us in blood, in thought and in ideas and system of government.”  He maintained the protective tariff benefited the wealthy manufactures of the East and North and he advocated protection for southern products.  Citing the high cost of products sold in the South and the cheaper prices in foreign markets, he said the difference in cost resulted in creation of combinations of wealth in this country “formerly known as trusts but to-day designated as the “community of interest” described as the “Morganization” of capital.”  During the minor issues, he said the government had appropriated funds to reclaim the arid lands of the West, and thus, there was no reason for the government not to assist in making Louisiana waterways more navigable. (18)

Election day found Lake Charles bustling with campaign workers and posters on cars, most of them for Pujo.  In the respect, one news story said:

Only one (poster) has appeared on the street for any other candidate.  The strange device it bore was “Polk, the laboring men’s friend; he favors deep water.”  It seems to be the consensus of opinion that the water is too deep for Bro. Polk, already. (19)

Confusion seemed the order of things election day and afterward, with candidates and others making charges and countercharges.  One citizen said voters in Grant Parish were voting without regard to registration or poll tax receipt and political activity in St. Landry had an “ominous appearance.” (20)  Blackman said later, “I do know that in St. Landry there are two thousand illegally registered voters.” (21)  Garland claimed there was fraud in Grant and Calcasieu parishes, saying 231 illegal votes were cast in Calcasieu, a charge to which Pujo delivered a lengthy reply.  In reference to the Garland accusations, Pujo said:

The demands of contestant (Garland) that the entire vote of Calcasieu, aggregating 1,776 votes, be cast out is arbitrary, unjust and highly improper, conceding that there might have been irregularities in a few precincts, which is denied. (22)

Garland said later there was no evidence of intentional fraud in Calcasieu and any apparent fraud was the act of individuals and not the parish or Pujo. (23)

Early election returns showed Pujo leading other candidates, but the final counting was slow.  Blackman and Garland were running close for second, and it was not until seven days following the primary that Pujo and Blackman were named second primary candidates.  Pujo had polled the highest number of voted, 2,076, while Blackman ran second with 1,778.  Garland placed third with 1,671 votes, and Polk was fourth with 492.  Over half of Pujo’s total vote came from Calcasieu where he polled 1,485 votes.  Garland received 1,338 votes in St. Landry, his home parish.  Blackman, on the other hand, received a substantial vote in Grant, Rapides, Vernon and Avoyelles parishes.   Cameron Parish was solid for Pujo, giving him 191 of the 192 ballots tallied. (24)

The second primary was scheduled for September 24, Pujo gained additional support from the Crowley News, and he was declared the nominee of the Democratic Party for Congress when second primary votes were tabulated by the district committee meeting at Alexandria.  He polled 4,094 votes and Blackman, 2,912, Pujo’s largest vote again coming from Calcasieu where he beat Blackman 1,860 to 105.  Other parishes carried by Pujo were St. Landry, Acadia, and Cameron; Blackman let in Rapides, Grant, Vernon, and Avoyelles. (25)

The Republican Party of the district held its nominating convention in Lake Charles September 20 and nominated Judge Gilbert L. Dupre of Opelousas for Congress. (26)  Pujo opened his campaign for the general election in Crowley on October 18.  In Lake Charles, when on October 31, he again stated his views on national issues, “the trusts particularly came under his scathing denouncement.”  He said the trust evil could be cured by a revision of the Dingley Tariff. (27)  Pujo carried every parish in the district in the general election November 4, receiving 3,233 votes to 545 for Dupre.  His majority was the largest of any congressman outside the First and Second Districts (New Orleans). (28)

At noon on March 4, 1903, Pujo became the representative of the Seventh Congressional District of Louisiana.  The Congress to which he had been elected was controlled by the Republican Party, having fifty-seven Republicans and thirty-three Democrats in the Senate and 208 Republicans and 176 Democrats in the House of Representatives. (29)  According to a biographical sketch of Pujo in 1913:

When he first came to Congress, in 1902 (1903), he had already a reputation for knowledge of financial matters.  The Louisiana delegation in the House of Representatives had him slated for membership in the Committee on Judiciary; but it so happened that there was no vacancy on the Democratic side of that committee, and so he was put into the committee on Banking and Currency…  (30)

Pujo was a member of the Committee on Banking and Currency during his first four terms in Congress, and he served as chairman of the committee during the Sixty-Second Congress from April 4, 1911 to March 4, 1913.

As a member of the minority party, Pujo voted for John Sharp Williams of Mississippi for Speaker of the House, but the old guard Republican, Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, was elected for his first of four terms as Speaker. (31)  Pujo made his maiden speech in the House on April 13, 1904, discussing finance, a topic that was to occupy much of his time and attention in Congress.  The House was discussing the Lewis Bill, a bill authorizing national banking institutions to accept security on real estate for loans made by them.  Loans made on real estate were not to exceed twenty-five percent of the capital of the national bank.  Pujo said the National Currency Act of 1863 had recognized the value of real estate as security, but contained no safeguard limiting the amount of capital a bank could invest in real estate.  He maintained the people of the United States paid interest on bonds held by these national banks, but were denied the use of the real estate for loans from these institutions.  He said:

This legislative and commercial anomaly then results; that the people are partially maintaining by taxation institutions in which their greatest item of value is denied recognition. (32)

In support of his position, he submitted a statement showing the location of national banks, by states, the relative distribution of their capital, the amount of bonds deposited in each bank and the interest paid on these bonds.  A second chart listed the assessed valuation of real estate in the United States, as well as valuation by state. (33)  The submission of charts, statistics, and other data were to be a characteristic of Pujo’s congressional remarks and speeches.  He was always acquainted with earlier legislation pertaining to the subject he was discussing and presented evidence to support his conclusions.

After only a year in Congress, Pujo made a statement concerning the Negro and Southern politics that was unusual for a southern Democrat in that day and time to make.  When questioned about the possible reduction of southern representation he said:

My belief, based on observation of conditions in Washington is that the Platt bill for the reduction of representation is not a serious measure.  We hear very little about the Negro question in Washington, except when it is mentioned by southern representatives.  The disposition of republican senators and congressmen is to leave matters as they are, unless the question is continually agitated by the southern people in which event they will be compelled in self defense, to enact legislation of some kind. (34)

Pujo felt President Theodore Roosevelt had proposed legislation which, if adopted, would result in benefit to the American people.  He said Roosevelt was sincere, remarking:

President Roosevelt’s administration bids fair to redound to the advantage of the people, if the measures advocated by him are adopted.  He is no doubt sincere in his advocacy of legislation investing the interstate commerce commission with power to fix freight rates.  It is also common knowledge that he favors legislation regulating trust by requiring all corporations engaged in interstate commerce to incorporate under national authority. (35)

After returning to Congress in 1905, Pujo felt the interests of the Seventh Congressional District were threatened when the Philippine Tariff Bill provided for a tariff on rice from the United States entering the recently-acquired islands.  An amendment was introduced which exempted the Philippines from the tariff provision relating to rice.  A chance for Pujo to speak up for the rice industry of his district had presented itself, and Pujo responded:  “The present tariff tax on rice from the United States into the archipelago results in discrimination against the people of our States engaged in that industry.”  Pujo considered the Curtis Bill, a pending bill proposing abolition of the duty on all goods coming into the United States from the Philippines with the exception of sugar and tobacco, an additional threat to American rice interests.  He quoted from a letter he had received from Dr. Seaman A. Knapp, a man he considered “perhaps the greatest living American authority upon rice culture in the United States and other countries.”  Pujo said passage of both the Philippine Tariff and Curtis Bills would result in Philippine rice coming to this country duty free while American rice exported to the islands would be taxed.  In his letter, Knapp said the passage of both bills “would completely ruin the rice industry of the United States.”  (36)   Proponents of the tariff said the Philippines needed the revenue the tariff would bring in.  During the course of his remarks, Pujo said, “Paraphrasing King Agrippa, one is tempted to exclaim, ‘Verily thou almost persuadest me to become a Filipino.’”  When the vote on the amendment deleting the tariff on rice was taken it was rejected. (37)

One of the primary accomplishments of Pujo’s congressional years was the introduction and passage of laws which benefited his district.  Aside from private bills, most of his legislation dealt with improvement of Louisiana waterways and construction of Federal buildings and post offices throughout his district.  He introduced his first bill on December 15, 1903, a bill asking for an appropriation to check sporadic outbreaks of the Mexican cotton-boll weevil which had begun to damage Louisiana’s cotton crop.  (38)  The agriculture appropriations bill passed during the Fifty-Eighth Congress appropriated $190,000 to meet the emergency caused by the weevil and other insects that were damaging the cotton crop. (39)

On December 16, 1903 Pujo introduced a bill asking an appropriation of $500,000 for improvement of the mouth and passes of the Calcasieu River.  The bill was described as “the first attempt that has been made for several years to place Calcasieu improvement upon a permanent footing….” (40)  Small appropriations had been made previously to dredge the inner harbor of the Calcasieu River, but there was no effort to construct jetties and make the harbor permanent until 1893 when Congressman Newton Blanchard got an appropriation of $100,000 for improvement of the river.  Pujo’s bill was the first major piece of legislation to follow that of Blanchard’s. (41)   His bill asked for funds in addition to $60,286 that had not been spent from a 1902 appropriation Congressman Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, chairman of the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors, visited Sabine Pass, Texas in June, 1904, and Pujo tried to get him to visit Lake Charles to inspect the work on Calcasieu Pass.  Burton wrote Pujo saying he would not be able to visit the area in his current trip.  (42)   In December, Pujo said the prospects of the harbor appropriation passing Congress were favorable in that the Board of Engineers of the War Department and the war department itself recommended improvements to the Calcasieu River. (43)  The Committee on Rivers and Harbors of the House first appropriated $80,000 for the Calcasieu, to which $20,000 was added later.  The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Bill of 1905 included $100,000 for improvement of the Calcasieu River and $40,000 for destruction of water hyacinth on the Mermentau, Calcasieu, and Sabine rivers, and appropriation also requested by Pujo.  In addition, the bill provided for improvements to the channel, bay, and passes of Bayou Vermilion and the Mermentau River, $15,000 for the improvement of the channel at Alexandria, and an appropriation for a survey of Calcasieu Lake and River and the Mermentau River. (44)  Pujo wired Mayor C. H. Winterhalter of Lake Charles that the survey of Calcasieu Lake and River was the first step to make Lake Charles a deep water port. (45)

As a lawyer, Pujo had made numerous trips from Lake Charles to Alexandria to participate in United States District Court suits.  This, no doubt, made him aware of the need for a branch of the district court in the Calcasieu Parish city.  On January 11, 1905, he introduced a bill creating the Western Judicial District of Louisiana and providing for the terms of court to be held at Lake Charles. (46)  The bill passed the House February 11, later passed the Senate, and was signed by the President March 3. (47)   Acadia, Calcasieu, Cameron, and Vernon parishes were to be served by the new judicial district. (48)

Having had relative success in his first term as a United States Representative, Pujo formally notified C. H. Teal, chairman of the Seventh District Committee, in July, 1904, that he would be a candidate to succeed himself.  There was no indication the 1904 campaign would be as active as it had been in 1902, and one report, in discussing the election, said:

A congressman is looked upon as naturally entitled to a second term, and politicians who know their business are not inclined to make an attempt to supplant the sitting congressman until he had had a fair chance to show what he can do for his district. (49)

Once again, he received the support of the Lake Charles Daily American, which said his personal qualities, convictions, and American, which said his personal qualities, convictions, and previous efforts in Congress would insure his re-election. (50)  James J. Dailey of St. Landry Parish and Judge A. V. Coco of Avoyelles Parish had been mentioned as possible candidates, but both decided not to run. (51)  The Seventh Congressional District Committee met in Alexandria July 30, and since Pujo had no opposition for re-election from the Democratic Party ranks, he was declared the party’s nominee for Congress. (52)  Joseph Lasalle, the Republican nominee for Congress, was Pujo’s only opponent in the general election on November 8, 1904.  Pujo easily defeated Lasalle 5,432 votes to 1,007. (53)

The Fifty-Ninth Congress, like the previous Congress, was controlled by the Republican Party.  Although the Senate Republican majority was the same as the Fifty-Eighth Congress, the Republican majority in the House increased to 112 from the previous thirty-two. (54)  Pujo again voted for Williams for Speaker, but, as expected, Cannon was re-elected. (55)  In addition to being reassigned to the Committee on Banking and Commerce, Pujo was named a member of the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and Labor. (56)

One of the first major pieces of legislation to which Pujo directs his attention was the Philippine Tariff Bill, an extension of the similar bill which Pujo had opposed in his first term.  In 1905, the Philippine Tariff Bill approved by Congress provided for tariff duties on rice exported from the United States to the archipelago.  The 1906 measure provided that goods from the Philippines, which the exception of sugar and tobacco, were to enter the United States free of duty.  According to Pujo, the Philippines, if the 1906 bill passed, could make a profit on rice they produced, save money on rice they bought, and American rice would not only be undersold in the United States, but the Philippine market would be closed to the American product.  In his remarks, Pujo stated Japan was an example of a country that both imported and exported rice, buying a cheaper grade for home consumption and selling the better grade in other markets.  A second argument he used to support his position was the Democratic Party belief in a tariff for revenue purposes.  He said the bill under consideration was removing the duties on rice and lowering the duties on sugar and tobacco, all revenue producing commodities.  He admitted the Philippines were territorially a part of the United States, but emphasized the Supreme Court ruling (in the Insular Cases) which granted to Congress the right to impose duties in the New American possessions. (57)

 Pujo said he did not believe in free trade, giving as his reason the absence of an income tax to provide funds for operation of the government. His position was summarized when he said:

In the event of a reduction of the tariff we should take revenue-producing articles, make up own budget of expenses, and endeavor to raise enough money to have it equalized upon all products brought into this country, so that this Government could be properly administered and its internal development continued.  If protection should incidentally result from such revision, very swell.  But I do not want to see the interests of my section of the country discriminated against. (58)

A glimpse of Pujo’s views on imperialism and capitalism are found in his closing remarks on the Philippine Tariff Bill when he stated:

Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of common observation that the love of its accumulation is so great that no opportunity to enter profitable speculation will be overlooked.  It may be true there are no capitalists in the Philippine Islands who will undertake to exploit this field, but there is capital in abundance in the United States aggressively searching for quick and large returns. No greater inducement could be offered than that which would present itself should this bill be adopted. (59)

An amendment to the Philippine Tariff Bill was introduced by Pujo on January 16, providing for a tariff on rice, sugar, and tobacco amounting to 25 percent of the rates provided under the Dingley Tariff. The amendment passed, and Pujo said later he had hopes the Senate committee hearing the bill would increase the tariff rate to Tariff rate of 40 percent. (60)  The Senate committee, however, refused to report the bill favorably, and the measure was dropped. (61)

A bill being discussed in the House in April, 1906, was an appropriate indictor of Pujo’s willingness to change his personal viewpoint if the occasion warranted.  Although opposed to concentration of capital and benefits to men of wealth, he advocated passage of a bill which would allow national banks to loan to customers 10 percent of their capital stock and 10 percent of their paid-in surplus. The banking act of 1863 had permitted banks to loan only 10 percent of their capital to one individual, firm, or corporation, and the bill supported by Pujo would increase the maximum single loan to 20 percent.  He said the demands of business were so great in 1906, it was essential the lending power of banks be increased.  He opposed the placing of a criminal penalty on the bill because it would result in stockholders of small banks selling their interests, fearing they would be held criminally liable for actions of a bank employee.  In the event banking institutions loaned out more than the legal 20 percent of their capital and surplus, Pujo felt the Comptroller of the Currency could enforce the provisions of the bill. (62)

Pujo’s voting record during the Fifty-Ninth Congress indicated his approval of additional government regulation of corporations, increased benefits for labor, and added protection for the American consumer. The Hepburn Bill, a bill designed to strengthen the Interstate Commerce Commission, had passed the House in the Fifty-Eighth Congress, but was pending in the Senate at the close of that Congress.  A major feature of the bill was its provision giving the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to regulate freight rates on railroads:  and, in addition, the commission was given jurisdiction over express sleeping-car companies, oil pipe lines, ferries, terminal facilities, and bridges.  Pujo had voted for the bill in 1905 and did so again when the bill came up in 1906.  All of the Louisiana members of Congress voted for the Hepburn Bill with the exception of Representative Robert F. Broussard of the Third District who was listed as “Not voting.”  The bill passed both houses and was signed by the President on June 30, 1906. (63)

One of the most notable reform measures passed, not only during the Fifty-Ninth Congress, but in the early twentieth century, was the Pure Food and Drug Act which “forbade the manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated or fraudulent labeled foods and drugs sold in interstate commerce.” (64)  Pujo and all but two of the Louisiana congressmen voted for the bill and it became law on June 30, 1906. Senator Murphy J. Foster voted against it, and Representative Adolph Meyer did not vote on the measure. (65)  During the second session of the Fifty-Ninth Congress, Pujo voted for a bill, the Sixteen Hour Bill, which limited the hours of work for railroad workers.  The bill stipulated railroad workers could not work more than sixteen hours on any one shift. (66)

Far removed from Congress in Victoria, Texas, in 1905 was an event which was to involve Pujo, as well as others, in a proposal that would revolutionize commerce throughout the Gulf Coast area; this was the formation of the Interstate Inland Waterway League of Louisiana and Texas.  The League envisioned an inland waterway stretching from Boston, Massachusetts, to the Rio Grande in Texas, but was primarily interested in excavation of an intracoastal canal from the Mississippi River in Louisiana to the Rio Grande. (67)  Louisiana Governor Newton Blanchard appointed Pujo as delegate to the Inland Waterway League’s convention in Lake Charles in 1906, and he welcomed the delegates to the city saying:

I have every reason to believe that from data now in the possession of the war department the portions of the proposed canal from the Mississippi to Vermillion by and from Galveston to the mouth of the Brazos River, and from Corpus Christi to Aransas Pass will be favorably recommended. (68)

The Interstate Waterways Executive Committee named Pujo delegate to a hearing on the intracoastal canal before the Board of Engineers at Galveston, Texas in November. (69)  In February 1907, the Rivers and Harbors Bill was up for discussion before the House;  it contained provisions for the intracoastal canal from Franklin to the Mermentau River in Louisiana, from Galveston to the Brazos in Texas, and from Aransas Pass to Pass Cavallo, also in Texas.  As far as Pujo was concerned, however, a major portion of the canal was not included in the bill, the section from the Mermentau River to the Sabine River, Texas.  Calcasieu and Cameron parishes had been ignored in the bill because those two parishes were to provide the route the canal would take from the Mermentau to the Sabine.  Pujo quoted from a board of engineers report which said the prospective and existing commerce of the section omitted did not warrant the digging of that portion of the canal at the present time.  He said he recognized the Committee of Rivers and Harbors’ need for a board of engineers, but did not believe the board’s recommendations should be final, particularly its recommendations as to the economic and commercial advisability of a project.  

The engineers had reported lumber was the only principal product of the section omitted, but Pujo emphasized that “half of the rice produced in the United States, practically all of the sulphur in North America, and millions upon millions of barrels of oil constitute a part of the output of that locality…”  He quoted from a report by the district officer of the Board of Engineers which traced the various commercial interests of the Mermentau-Sabine area.  He presented statistics to lend support to his stand on the issue and was not critical of the rivers and harbors committee, saying:

From the outset of my remarks it was apparent that I was opposed to this bill because of its want of legislative logic.  I realize that owing the tradition of the House it is immaterial whether the bill be logical or not, as the committee’s report is always adhered to by the membership unless consent is given by the chairman to change the bill.  The chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee is entitled to the respect of everyone, yet he has his pride of opinion as well as others, and is in a position to weigh and exercise the great power in his hands. I have no hope of persuading him to change the report of the committee…

I was told that it (the section) was refused because the Board of Engineers declined to approve the report of the district officer.  Yet this record discloses the fact that the Board of Engineers refused to approve the Cold Springs Inlet project, Cape May. (The Cold Springs project was approved by the committee.) (70)

Regarding the Board of Engineers, Pujo said there seemed to be a disposition on the part of Congress to delegate power to commissions and bureaus, “and thereafter they awaken to the sad realization that the creature has become greater than the creator.”  He had offered an amendment to the Rivers and Harbors Bill providing for the digging of the Mermentau-Sabine Section of the canal, but withdrew the amendment, feeling the amendment would not pass and a vote against it in the House at this time might imperil its future passage.  Withdrawal of the amendment did not mean he had abandoned hope for the canal because he closed his remarks by saying, “this amendment will yet become the law of the land.”(71)  An appropriation was added to the bill in the Senate providing for the omitted section of canal, but it was deleted by a conference committee. (72)

Pujo was successful in gaining approval of other miscellaneous waterway improvements in the district.  The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Bill passed during the session provided for $25,000 to improve the mouth and passes of the Calcasieu River, $25,000 for improving the Mermentau River and Bayou Vermilion, $2,500 for improving Johnsons Bayou, and appropriations for surveys of Bayous Courtableau and Plaquemine Brule and Boyce Landing on the Red River, and lighting of the Grand Lake Channel. (73) The pubic Buildings Appropriation Bill authorized $125,000 for building a Federal building and post office at Lake Charles. (74)

An evaluation of Pujo’s first four years in Congress was probably best presented in a resolution by the Lake Charles Board of Trade which said:

During his four years’ service in the house, Hon. A. P. Pujo, by his fidelity to the interests of his constituents, individually and collectively, has demonstrated in a most striking manner the value of the services an untiring, intelligent representative can give…

Our public thanks are due Hon. A. P. Pujo for his labors in behalf of the waterways of his district, all of which have received the benefit of his attention, and more especially are we pleased by the success he has so far attained in forwarding the construction of the Intercoastal canal, which will be immeasurable benefit to the greater part of his district…

Whether success finally crowns his efforts in this direction at the present session, or is deferred until some future session of congress, we are confident that our interests could be placed in no more capable, energetic and indefatigable hands than in those of the Seventh district representative. (75)  

CHAPTER IV

LATER CONGRESSIONAL TERMS, 1907 - 1913

Pujo’s intention to seek a third Congress was noted on July 19, 1906, in an editorial in the Lake Charles Daily American.   The editorial said his choice by the Democratic Party was a “foregone conclusion,” and urged “Seventh district voters to give Mr. Pujo, if not an unanimous re-election to congress, one as nearly unanimous as possible.” (1)   In addition to citing his efforts to aid the rice industry of the district, the editorial noted his prompt compliance with every request made by his constituents, a service the article termed a service not generally recognized.

The Seventh Congressional District Democratic Committee met in Alexandria July 3, setting September 6, 1906, as the date for the congressional primary.  Later the committee, meeting in Lake Charles, changed the primary date to September 6. (2)  Judge W. F. Blackman of Alexandria was once again mentioned as a candidate, to which the Lake Charles Daily American sarcastically remarked:
 

Judge W. F. Blackman of Alexandria states that he will be a candidate for the congressional nomination of this district this fall.  This is the judge’s favorite amusement.  Whenever the cares of the judgeship weigh too heavy upon him, the judge doffs his judicial ermine, has his bows scraped and his hull painted, and chases around the lake to show that he is able to run with any of them.  Then he goes back home and his admiring constituents present him with another term as judge. (3)

Blackman told the people of Jennings he would enter the race “when he is assured of fair treatment.”  The pro-Pujo Daily American continued to ridicule Blackman’s indecision saying:

The judge hesitates too long, as Col. Shakespeare remarks, “letting ‘I dare not’ wait upon ‘I would,’ like poor cat i’ the adage.”  The cream jug will be empty before he has his mind made up. (4)

Apparently harboring grievances from the 1902 campaign, Blackman withdrew from the race.  Pujo was critical of Blackman’s insinuations, remarking on July 27 that he could “not sit idly by and let Blackman criticize or question the political integrity of practically the entire citizenship of this district.”(5)

John A. Michel, secretary of state of Louisiana, notified Pujo on August 20, announcing that Pujo was the only Democratic candidate who had qualified from the Seventh District. (6) In the general election November 6, Pujo faced a veteran Republican aspirant for Congress, C. C. Duson.  Duson was a Republican candidate for Congress from the Sixth District in 1896. (7)  The third candidate in the general election was James Barnes, the Socialist Party candidate.  Only 5,688 votes were cast in the general election, Pujo receiving 3,761, Duson 1,762, and Barnes 165. (8)

Representation in the Sixtieth Congress changed very little in 1907, the Republicans gaining three additional seats in the Senate and two in the House.  Pujo was again named to the Committee on Banking and Currency and the Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and Labor.  He voted for Williams for Speaker, as he had done in previous two Congresses, but with a Republican majority Cannon was re-elected. (9)

The first major measure to be discussed during the Sixtieth Congress, the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, was one which demonstrated Pujo’s knowledge of finance and his erudition in banking and currency transactions, both of which were to later provide the medium through which he gained national recognition.  A stock market drop and business failure in 1907, both resulting in the Panic of 1907, revealed flaws in the currency and credit structure of the United States. The Aldrich-Vreeland Bill provided any ten banks uniting with a minimum capital of $5,000.000 (sic) would have the right to issue emergency currency, creating a possible emergency issue of $500,000,000 of national bank notes to be redeemable by the United States Treasury.  Pujo was an opponent of the bill and one of it outspoken critics.  He prefaced his remarks, when the bill was being discussed in the House, by saying, “Mr. Speaker, legislation of the character incorporated in this bill, offered in seriousness, is absolutely unnecessary to be adopted by this House.”  He said times had changed since the depression and banks had an ample supply of money in 1908.  The bill, he said, was basing a currency on credits and bonds which would be issued, though not on the stock exchanges of the country, and the currency issued would go to New York and other large financial centers.  Pujo did, however, commend the Republican Party for its adoption of the asset currency idea.  He maintained the financial associations formed as a result of the bill would be formed primarily in the East where the currency would be issued for speculative purposes and not for use by the industrial and farming sections of the country where it was needed.  He said the only legislation needed in 1908 was that which would require banks to maintain reserve in their vaults thereby permitting retirement of circulation without limitation.  He said:

We find that the reason of the currency famine of 1907 was this: the national-bank act requires all banks outside of reserve cities to maintain a reserve of 15 percent of their deposits, 9 percent of which they are entitled to keep in reserve cities.
 

When it gets to the reserve cities, the reserve bank is entitled to use it as it sees fit, provided it keeps 25 percent, or $2.25, of that $9, in its vaults.  Therefore the law, although intending to protect the depositors by the requirement that 15 percent of deposits shall be kept as a reserve, it is manipulated that only 8 ¼ percent $6 in the vault and $2.25 in the reserve bank---is kept; and the balance of the reserve is loaned out on call to speculative interests, just as it was last fall. And when the bank in the country called upon its reserve bank for its money, it had been loaned out and could not be returned, and the country banks therefore had to suspend payment, as well as those in the large cities which were responsible for the conditions because of their methods of doing business. (10)

In summary, Pujo termed the bill socialistic because it provided “the duty of the Government to enact laws declaring all men to be equal in ability, education, economy, and probity;” paternalistic because it would “substitute for the direction and control of the bank other than those selected by the stockholders to manage the affairs of their particular bank;” class legislative “because it is for the creditor class of this country…;” unconstitutional “to the extent that a tax is levied, the proceeds of which are to be applied for a private purpose;” and he added that it would reduce instead of increase reserves. (11)  Pujo's use of the word socialistic in his description of the bill denotes an inconsistency because he also said the bill was class legislation.  He perhaps wanted to imply that the bill was socialistic in that it guaranteed equality to certain groups, in which case, the term “class legislation” would have been sufficient to convey his meaning.  Indicating the uselessness of the bill, he said all that was needed at the time was legislation compelling payment of interest by banks on government deposits, requiring banks to take out circulation in an amount equal to their capital, and providing reserves be kept by banks for local needs. (12)

Pujo was named a conferee on the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, but, evidently dissatisfied with the conference report on the bill, he voted against the report when it was presented to the House on May 27.  The House adopted the report, however, by a vote of 166 to 140, and President Roosevelt signed the bill May 30, 1908. (13)  One description of the bill said:

It was not satisfactory to any element in the community (banking community) and as the defective character of its language came to be better and better understood, there was an increasing demand for something of a more thorough going nature. (14)

A feature of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act which one writer termed “much more significant then the actual currency sections” was the creation of the National Monetary Commission, assigned the task of inquiring into and Asia to determine what legislation was necessary to correct any evils in the American system. (15)  Although Pujo had voted against the bill in the House and against the conference report on the bill, he was named one of nine representatives and nine senators appointed members of the National Monetary Commission. (16)

Overwhelming approval was given the Employers’ Liability Bill when it came before the House in April, 1908, the vote for the bill being 302 to one.  Pujo voted for the act which placed the liability for injuries to railroad employees in the hands of the employer. (17) 

Regarding local legislation, Pujo introduced a bill January 11, 1908, providing for construction of an intracoastal canal from the Mermentau River to the Sabine River on the Texas-Louisiana border, a project which he was unable to include in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Bill in 1907.  He was afraid there would be no river and harbor legislation passed in 1908, but efforts were being made to have public hearings on the bill.  He arranged a hearing before the Committee on Rivers and Harbors of the House in March, and the Board of Engineers of the War Department conducted hearings in Lake Charles on June 18.  Leon Locke, secretary of the Lake Charles Board of Trade, coordinated local efforts for the canal and Pujo directed matters in Congress.  Efforts were stalled temporarily when the House committee voted against a general appropriations bill early in 1909. (18)

Pujo was not discouraged, however, and in the second session of the Sixtieth Congress he introduced an identical measure to the one he sponsored in the first session; in addition, he introduced a companion measure asking for a survey and cost estimate of an interstate waterway nine feet in depth and one hundred feet in width from the Mississippi River in Louisiana to the Rio Grande in Texas.  The first bill was not acted on, but the survey was approved and $25,000 was appropriated to finance the survey; the appropriation was to be provided annually until the survey was completed.  Portions of the intracoastal canal were already under construction, but Pujo’s bill was asking for a survey which was to determine the feasibility of making the canal wider and deeper. (19)  Surveys of Bayous Courtableau, Cocodrie, and Boeuf were authorized in the rivers and harbors maintenance bill in 1909, and the Board of Engineers of the War Department appropriated funds for improving navigation in Bayou Plaquemine Brule; Pujo had requested the surveys in bills he introduced. (20)

In 1906, Pujo had introduced a bill proposing a Federal building at Crowley; the bill failed but he introduced it again in 1908. When the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds provided only $5,000 for the projects in 1908, Pujo was successful in getting Louisiana’s junior senator, Murphy J. Foster, to increase the appropriation when the bill reached the Senate.  An appropriation of $55,000 was authorized and $15,000 was provided to begin work on the project. (21)  Crowley’s gratitude for Pujo’s efforts were indicated in an editorial in the Crowley Daily Signal which said:  

The importance of this….achievement is appreciated when it is understood that by an unwritten law of the committee on public buildings only towns of 10,000 inhabitants or more are given appropriations for public buildings except under exceptional circumstances, such as great distance from any other federal building.  The appropriation for Crowley was secured in spite of this rule of the committee and at a time when the party in power was doing everything possible to hold down appropriations and especially in the South, where it has no chance for electoral votes.

Congressman Pujo has made good as a man who does things.  He is a worker and his work counts for the folks at home. (22)

Pujo said in March, 1908, that plans for the Lake Charles Federal building and post office had been approved, construction to begin in about ninety days. (23)

Pujo’s record in Congress was a successful one, making it possible for him to cite positive accomplishments when he announced for a fourth term in 1908.  Mention was made of his efforts which had resulted in improved and more navigable waterways in the Seventh District, appropriation for Federal buildings at Lake Charles and Crowley, and a voting record resulting in legislation beneficial to all groups.  He had voted for the Employer’s Liability Act, Hepburn Act, and bills raising salaries of postal clerks and limiting hours of work for railroad workers and laborers and mechanics engaged in public works projects.  He was depicted as a champion of rice interests for his opposition to the Philippine Tariff Bill; he had been instrumental in having sixteen rural free delivery routes established in the district; he was the ranking member of the Committee on Banking and Currency, leading the minority opposition to the Aldrich-Vreeland Act and attending all hearings before the committee; and he was a member of the National Monetary Commission. This impressive list of accomplishments was the medium through which Pujo’s re-election would be advocated. (24)  Newspaper support of Pujo multiplied in 1908, and he received the backing of the Bunkie Review, Leesville Leader, Crowley Daily Signal, Opelousas Courier, St. Landry Clarion, Grant Parish Democrat, and Lake Charles Daily American. (25)

William Polk of Rapides, an opponent of Pujo’s in 1902, was the only candidate to enter the race against Pujo.  The district committee set September 1, 1908, as the date for the primary and planned a Lake Charles meeting for September 4 to tabulate returns. (26)  Polk was to wage a successful campaign, and Pujo was to lose much of the support he commanded in the first three elections to Congress.  For the first time, Pujo’s legal practice became the major issue in the primary. Polk charged that Pujo, because he was legal counsel for the Union Sulphur Company, represented big business interests:  principally the Standard Oil Company.  A Polk advertisement in the St. Landry Clarion on July 25, 1908, quoted from a story in the New Orleans States which reported the events of a case being heard in the Federal courts between the Union Sulphur Company and Calcasieu Parish.  The parish had raised the assessment of the sulphur company two years in a row, and the company appealed to the Federal courts for a ruling on the assessment increase.  Part of the Polk advertisement emphasized Pujo’s role in the case stating, “CONGRESSMAN A. P. PUJO CAME FROM WASHINGTON TO HANDLE THE INTERESTS OF THE SULPHUR COMPANY.’’ (27)

Judge Gilbert L. Dupre of Opelousas, former Republican candidate for Congress in 1902, came to Pujo’s defense in an article in the Clarion on August 1.  Dupre said there was nothing in the New Orleans States story connecting Pujo with the Standard Oil Company.  He said he was surprised Polk had not mentioned that Pujo’s firm was counsel for the Southern Pacific Railroad since many persons maintained the Standard Oil Company and Southern Pacific “are hand in glove with one another.”   Dupre surmised Polk had omitted the railway connection because it would point up the inconsistency in Polk’s argument; Pujo had voted for the Employer’s Liability Act and the Hepburn Act, both restricting railways, and if his connection with one firm did not influence his voting in Congress, how could his association with a second firm? (28)

Dupre, though probably unaware of it at the time, had furnished Polk with additional information with which to strengthen his pro-business indictment of Pujo.  A  Polk advertisement in the Colfax Chronicle remarked:

In its issue of last week the St. Landry Clarion published an article signed by Judge Gilbert L. Dupre of Opelousas, in which he takes the Polk Campaign Committee to task for the publication of the article headed “Who does the Congressman from this District Represent, the People or the Standard Oil Co.,” and sets forth at length his reason supporting Mr. Pujo in his race for Congress.

Recently there appeared in the Lake Charles American an interview originally published in the Beaumont Enterprise, with Major S. Arthur Knapp, in which are set forth practically the same reasons why the people of the 7^th Congressional District should return Mr. Pujo in the September primaries.

That such identical doctrines emanate from two such sources is not at all surprising, when the political records of the gentlemen in question are considered we find on the one hand Judge Gilbert L. Dupre formerly the Republican candidate for Congress from this district, and the opponent of the man whose cause he now so forcibly advocates, and on the other Major S. Arthur Knapp, a long avowed Republican, an appointee in the Bureau of Plant Industry from Mr. Pujo’s own parish, and probably upon his advice, or at least, with his consent and approbation. 

Arguments from these sources at once bring forth the question as to whether the democratic voters of the district are to take their Democracy from the avowed enemies of their party, or are to view the issue of the campaign themselves or be guided by the example and reasoning of men who have ever clung to the party of the white people in times of stress, and whose faith has never been open to question. (29)

Meanwhile, Pujo explained his connection with the Union Sulphur Company, saying he was employed as counsel prior to his first term in 1902, and “had no apologies to make for continuing to act in that capacity when such professional connection did not interfere with his duties as a representative.” (30)  The firm of Pujo and Moss had been employed by Herman Frasch, president of Union Sulphur, in 1896 and on occasions after that time.  A notarized statement by Frasch appeared in the Lake Charles Daily American on August 6, in which he denied any connection between the Union Sulphur Company and the Standard Oil Company.  He said he knew where all the company money came from and none of  it came from Standard Oil.  Part of the statement read:

I know every stockholder of the Union Sulphur Company and am consequently in a position to state absolutely that the Standard Oil Company has not today, nor ever had, any interest of any kind, from or manner, direct or indirect in the Union Sulphur Company, or in the sulphur mines located in Calcasieu parish, Louisiana. (31)

Pujo and Polk participated in a joint debate at Leesville during the campaign, a debate termed by a pro-Pujo newspaper as distinctly a Pujo victory and, (which) resulted, probably, in gaining additional friends and supporters for Mr. Pujo in Vernon parish.” (32)  The newspaper was overly optimistic, however, because Polk carried Vernon Parish in the primary, Polk had apparently conducted an effective campaign, for when official returns were published, Pujo was declared the nominee by the narrowest margin he had yet encountered, 7,602 votes to 6,266.  Acadia was the decisive parish, Pujo getting 1,607 votes to 403 for Polk.  Pujo carried, in addition to Acadia, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Grant, and St. Landry parishes; Polk carried Rapides and Vernon parishes.  Pujo’s home parish of Calcasieu had evidently lost some of the fervor for its favorite son, the vote there being 1,514 to 1,221. (33)

What had caused Pujo to lose much of his support in Calcasieu Parish and the rest of the Seventh District?  How was Polk, a candidate who ran fourth in the district in 1902 with 492 votes, able to poll 6,266 votes in the 1908 election?  No exact answer to these questions is available, but there may be some hint as to the possible answer.  Polk had injected Pujo’s professional ties into the election as a major issue.  Pujo was a successful attorney; he did represent the Union Sulphur Company which controlled eighty percent of the country’s sulphur supply; he was instrumental in having the sulphur company’s tax assessment in Calcasieu lowered after it had been raised by the parish assessor; Pujo’s firm was the counsel for the Southern Pacific Railroad in Lake Charles; Pujo represented thirty to forty corporations according to later congressional hopefuls.  Polk accused Pujo of trying to serve two masters, the electorate of the Seventh District and the corporations.  As far as the record indicates his legal associations did not interfere with his congressional duties, Pujo’s main defense of his voting record was his vote for legislation increasing government regulation over railroads. 

However, there prevailed in the United States beginning in the first decade of the twentieth century a suspicion of corporations, trusts, mergers, industrial alliances, and financial concentration.  Congressional investigations were giving credence to the prevailing suspicion.  It is not unlikely that Pujo’s association with corporations created an atmosphere of doubt in the minds of many voters in the Seventh District.  Though the connection did not necessarily indicate any direct control over the congressman, the doubt was there and better to chance a vote for anyone but one allied with interests though sinister and mysterious. 

A report, in circulation before the general election, indicated that Pujo might be a successor to Judge Aleck Boarman, United States judge of the Western Judicial District of Louisiana who was to retire.  Pujo refused to comment on the report because, he said, a vacancy did not yet exist. (34)  Lake Charles monopolized the general election, Alexander Hymes of Lake Charles being Pujo’s only competition.  Hymes was the Socialist Party candidate, and he made an improved showing over the 1906 Socialist candidate, James Barnes.  Pujo carried every parish in the district, receiving 8,270 votes to 585 for Hymes.  Barnes had polled only 165 votes in 1906.  The Socialist vote in 1908 increased substantially in Vernon, Calcasieu, and Acadia parishes. (35) 

Congressional conditions for Pujo in the Sixty-First Congress were practically identical to those in the Sixtieth; the Republicans still controlled the House and Senate, Pujo was again named to the Committees on Banking and Currency and Expenditures in the Department of Commerce and Labor, and Cannon was re-elected Speaker; however, Champ Clark of Missouri had replaced the Mississippian Williams as Democratic Party choice for the top House position. (36)

William Howard Taft, the man whom Roosevelt had chosen to succeed him in the White House, was elected President in 1908.  Being a advocate of lower tariff rates, Taft called a special session of Congress in 1909 for the purpose of revising the rates of the Dingley Tariff of 1897.  The tariff which resulted from the session was the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, a tariff bill which encountered little difficulty in the House, but which was amended over eight hundred times in the Senate, restoring most of the old Dingley rates.  A new version of the Republican Party’s definition of a protective tariff stated:

In all protective legislation the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of protection at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries. (37)

Though appearing to advocate an equalization of trade, the Republican principle “means simple prohibition and complete stoppage of foreign trade,” according to F. W. Taussig in The Tariff History of the United States. (38)

Pujo stated his tariff position clearly when the tariff bill was up for discussion in the House, a position very much in line with the Republican Party concept.  He said:

I am in favor of a fair duty upon every article imported into the United States which may be produced here, provided that such rates shall not be prohibitive.  In other words, I believe in a duty equal to the difference between the cost of production plus transportation.  Now, I am perfectly aware that some of my colleagues on this side of the House will assert that it is not the function of the Government to guarantee a profit to anyone who may be engaged in an enterprise.  That is perfectly true; but I consider this a misstatement of the case.  I believe it to be the duty of the Government, when the question of the welfare of its citizens is to be weighed in the balance with those of other countries, that there should be no discrimination against our own citizens.  So my views on the question of the imposition of a tariff tax are that the representatives of the people owe it to them to so legislate that no citizens of a foreign country shall be permitted to offer for sale in this country any competitive article under conditions more favorable than is enjoyed by an American citizen.  It has been my intention to be entirely frank with my colleagues upon this question.

The views I express to-day I have entertained for many years, as is well known to the people of my State and district.  Louisiana is a State and great in the production of raw material.  She leads in cane sugar; in the output of yellow pine; is second in the United States in timber production; and is a large producer of cotton.  She produces practically half of the rice in the United States; one-third of the sulphur of the world; and her people do not subscribe to the doctrine that the raw material must be free and the finished product protected. (39)

The Democratic Party platform of 1908 stated:  “We demand the immediate repeal of the tariff on wood pulp, print paper, lumber, timber and logs, and that these articles be placed upon the free list." (40)  And, yet, it was the placing of lumber on the free list to which Pujo objected.  He presented statements and statistics during his remarks which indicated that Louisiana manufactured more yellow-pine lumber than any other state in the Uni-on; it converted more cypress into lumber than any other state; the Seventh District of Louisiana was the largest yellow-pine district in the United States; the cost of lumber production in Louisiana was high, resulting in several sawmills in the district suspending operations; and the principal loss, if lumber was placed of the free list, would be suffered by the laborers, a lost approximating twenty percent of present wages.  Pujo said he favored the lumber rates of the Dingley Tariff, remarking:

A year or so ago I received a communication from the Chamber of Commerce of Saginaw, I think, requesting me to stand for free lumber.  I have not the communication before me, neither have I my answer thereto.  But according to my recollection my reply was, that when our Southland was denuded of lumber, as in Michigan and other Northern and Northwestern States, I might consider the argument for placing lumber upon the free list. 

Such is my attitude to-day. (41)

When asked from whom he desired protection, Pujo said Canada, because labor in the Dominion was cheaper than that in the United States.  He said he did not understand how a representative from a section whose products were protected could advocate placing lumber on the free list. 

Turning from a discussion of lumber to rice, Pujo presented similar arguments to those he had presented in 1905 and 1906 in reference to free trade with the Philippines.  Why, he asked, should the Philippines be allowed to tax American rice and in turn be able to ship rice to the United States free of duty?  He admitted the Philippine experiment was costly, but thought any deficit operation of the islands should be financed from the treasury and not from a tariff on American rice.  He said, “The Ways and Means Committee should have been just before being generous.” (42)  In April, the Committee on Ways and Means offered an amendment to the tariff which provided for placing a tariff duty on rice, two cents a pound for clean rice and one and one-fourth cents for uncleaned rice.  Louisiana’s Representative Robert Broussard presented this amendment to the House, and he and Pujo were successful in having it approved.  Broussard said the Philippines did not want the rice tariff removed because they wanted the Philippine rice for home consumption and payment of wages.  Representative Joseph W. Fordney of Michigan explained Philippine tariff payments were returned to the islands and the Philippines were therefore opposed to free trade.  Pujo introduced a new argument in support of his belief in tariffs for the Philippines, saying closer trade relations with the islands would make it harder to grant independence to the Philippines when they were ready. (43)

Two additional features of the bill on which Pujo remarked were the inheritance and income taxes.   He doubted the constitutionality of the inheritance tax because it could be argued that it was a tax on real estate, therefore a direct tax and could only be levied by apportionment among the states.  Since thirty-six states levied inheritance taxes and the measure being discussed taxed inheritances exceeding five hundred dollars, Pujo felt it would be a double tax and would be imposed primarily on person of moderate means.  He stated:

However, it seems these days that the function of government is to devise new methods of taking away from the people that which they have worked for instead of making their burdens as light as possible. (44)

Pujo, nevertheless, favored a Federal income tax, feeling that Congress had been vested with the right to levy such a tax.  The argument that on income tax was one of “inquisitorial character,” he said, was weak because citizens had to describe property holdings for taxation and “requiring one to declare his income would not introduce any new feature in the taxing system of the United States.” (45)

Apparently satisfied with the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in its final form when it left the House, Pujo voted for the measure as did three other members of the Louisiana delegation, Albert Estopinal, Robert Broussard, and Robert C. Wickliffe. John T. Watkins and Joseph Ransdell of Louisiana voted against it. (46)  In the Senate, Nelson W. Aldrich, ultra conservative Republican and high protectionist, successfully combined local interests and increased the rates of the measure.  When the Senate finally voted on the bill, Louisiana’s Samuel McEnery voted for it, and Murphy J. Foster voted against it.  When the House refused to agree to the Senate amendments, the bill ended up in a conference committee.  The conference report led to a change in the voting of the Louisiana delegation.  Pujo, Wickliffe, Watkins, Ransdell, Samuel Gilmore (Davey’s replacement), and Foster voted against the conference report; Estopinal and Broussard voted for the report and McEnery was recorded as not voting.  The Payne-Aldrich Tariff passed the House 195 to 183, and passed the Senate forty-seven to thirty-one; President Taft signed the bill August 5, 1909. (47)  According to one authority, the tariff brought no essential changes in our tariff system, though “it was less aggressively protectionist than the previous Republican measures.” (48)  The Senate had removed the inheritance provision from the bill, but in its final form the bill provided for establishment of a tariff commission and a federal tax on corporations engaged in interstate business. (49)

Pujo had deviated from Democratic Party policy when he supported the lumber tariff in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff; he again deviated from the party’s policy when he opposed the Canadian Reciprocal Trade Agreement signed by the Taft administration in 1911.  Prior to passage of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, Taft had been concerned over Canadian-American trade relations and contemplated signing a reciprocal trade agreement with the Dominion.  Canada was an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured products; the United States had an exportable surplus of manufactured goods and needed raw materials.  The reciprocal idea had merit with one exception:  Each year the United States had an agricultural surplus, yet, Canadian agricultural products would come into the United States free of duty under the terms of a reciprocal agreement.  Nevertheless, the treaty was signed with the Liberal government in Canada and presented to Congress for approval; the House, as well as the Senate, had to approve the treaty since it contained revenue clauses.  Eastern merchants and manufacturers approved of the treaty; eastern and western farmers bitterly opposed it.  Congressional Republican leaders and the Republican progressives opposed the treaty; the Democratic Party decided to support its passage in Congress. (50)

Thus the stage was set for consideration of the treaty in Congress in 1911.  Although the Democratic caucus voted to support the treaty, Pujo felt that individual members could not be required to vote for the bill and said he would speak against it when it came before the House. (51)  On February 14, when the bill came up for discussion, Pujo remarked:

Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the bill under consideration and to the reciprocity treaty recently negotiated…for the primary reason that the manner in which the trade agreement was entered into and the manner in which it was brought to the consideration of Congress is, according to my view, violative of both the letter and spirit of our Federal Constitution.

While it was true that the Congress of the United States is ostensibly considering the provisions of the bill writing into law the reciprocal agreement entered into by the President with the Dominion of Canada, yet in truth and fact, this bill is not being considered with due regard for orderly procedure, in that the President of the United States not only initiated and originated the measure, but the power of his great office is recognized and felt in this chamber as one of the strongest arguments in favor of its enactment into law.

Mr. Chairman, the appetite grows on what it feeds.  If the Chief Executive of the United States be permitted to enter into reciprocal trade agreement with the Dominion of Canada, , , he will no doubt feel encouraged by the approval of his course and will enter into similar agreements with other countries, and thereby radically change the economic policies of our Government with reference to our commercial relations with other nations of the world. (52)

To support his contentions, Pujo quoted from a story in the Washington Herald which said Taft and Champ Clark, in speeches before the Pan American Commercial Conference, had indicated they favored world-wide reciprocity.  The story further stated that informal discussion between the State Department and the Mexican ambassador were being held with a view to opening reciprocal trade negotiations with Mexico.  

Pujo said a majority of farmers opposed the Canadian treaty and they should be the best judges of it merits since agricultural products were, principally, the items on which the tariff was to be lowered under the terms of the agreement.  That his views were not in accord with Democratic Party policy was illustrated when he said:

Mr. Chairman, I had hoped that when the Democratic Party found itself partially restored to power and on the way to come into its own again in all three departments of the Government that we would base our claim before the American people for a longer tenure of power upon the fact that we would endeavor to carry out in letter and spirit the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and restore all power where it was lodged by the great instrument – in the hands of the Representatives legally chosen by the electors of the country. (53)

If Canadian reciprocity was good, he said, let the newly-created Tariff Board gather the facts and then submit to Congress legislation to affect a treaty with Canada - all of which would originate in the House where the Constitution established the power.  The bill passed the House by a vote of 221 to ninety-three and of the fice [five] democrats who voted against it three were Louisianans, Estopinal, Broussard, and Pujo. (54)  The bill did not pass the Senate during the Sixty-First Congress, and Taft later called a special session of the Sixty-Second Congress for its consideration counting on support of the Democratic House for its passage.

Taft’s dependence on the Democratic Party support had resulted from a rift in Republican Party ranks. During the final years of the Roosevelt administration, conservative Republican leadership, principally that of House Speaker Joseph Cannon and Senator Aldrich.  When the new session opened in March, 1910, these progressives or “insurgents” were determined to deprive Cannon of much of his power in the House Committee on Rules making the committee elective by the House and depriving the Speaker of membership on the committee.  A Democratic-Insurgent coalition gained passage of the resolution, Pujo voting for it. (57)

One of the most significant measures to pass during the Sixty-First Congress was the Sixteenth Amendment, providing for an income tax.  All of Louisiana’s senators and representatives voted for the new Federal tax. (58)

While active in national affairs, Pujo continued to promote the interests of the Seventh District by introducing legislation benefiting the district and taking part in programs outside Congress designed to aid pending legislation.  In 1908, he was invited to attend the Chicago meeting of the Lakes-to-the-Gulf Deep Waterway Association and attended the group’s meeting in New Orleans in 1909 after joining President Taft on a trip from St. Louis to the Crescent City.  Also in 1908, he was named a delegate to the Mississippi Atlantic Inland Waterways Association’s annual meeting in Jacksonville, Florida. (59)

Pujo’s past efforts to gain approval for the intracoastal canal from the Mermentau to Sabine rivers gained recognition in 1909, when the War Department Board of Engineers recommended an appropriation of $300,000 to construct that portion of the canal. On January 4, 1910, Pujo introduced a bill which asked for the appropriation for the project.  In June, 1910, President Taft signed the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Bill, which provided for its construction. (60)  Plans called for the canal to be five feet deep and forty feet wide, but citizens of Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish floated a $250,000 bond issue to provide for a nine foot depth and one hundred foot bottom width for that portion of the canal from the Calcasieu to the Sabine rivers. (61)

The Lake Charles Daily American-Press, summarizing efforts to secure the canal and estimating its value, stated:

This result (securing canal appropriation) is a tribute to the energy and faithful work of the Inland Waterway Association which originally advocated the improvement and is a triumph for Representative A. P. Pujo who after the board of engineers had turned a cold shoulder upon the proposition, induced them and members of the Rivers and Harbors Committee to make a personal  inspection and examination of the route and succeeded in convincing them of the feasibility of the improvement and its value to the surrounding country.

It is impossible to overestimate the value of this water route to the territory surrounding Lake Charles or the part it will play in building up the manufacturing interests of Southwest Louisiana.  The first section let, from the Mermentau to Vermillion bay, is now nearing completion, so that Lake Charles will have an inland water route, as soon as trans-Cameron section is completed, not only to New Orleans but also to the side of ocean going steamships at Port Arthur (Texas) and Sabine Pass.  The benefits that will be derived from this cheap transportation are foreshadowed by the fact that the North American Land and Timber Co., constructed canals at its own expense from Calcasieu Lake practically to the Mermentau, for the purpose of transporting its own products and supplies, and has found that the saving in freight rates alone justifies the outlay.

Upon this great artery of commerce Lake Charles will be the chief city in Louisiana and will reap benefits accordingly. (62)

One of the waterway measures introduced by Pujo marked the beginning of the end to a conflict of interest over a dam in the Mermentau River.  Rice farmers in the Mermentau area needed the dam to keep salt water out of the upper part of the river, whereas small farmers and stock growers complained about repeated flooding caused by the dam.  Shortly after the dam was built, a mysterious explosion partially destroyed the dam.  Rice farmers raised money to repair the dam and stationed guards at the dam to prevent its destruction.  In October, 1907, however, the dam was again blown up with no hint as to who was responsible.  The dam was not needed in 1908 because of heavy rains, but all interested parties hoped to find a solution to the conflict before a new crop of rice was planted.  Pujo planned a hearing before the Board of Engineers at which all interested persons were invited to be heard; the hearing resulted in a decision to construct a dam at the foot of Grand Lake where both sides in the issue would be protected. (63)

In other local legislation Pujo was successful in getting authorization for a Federal building and post office at Jennings.  The Sixty-First Congress authorized $50,000 for the building and site and appropriated $10,000 to begin construction. (64)

Early in 1910, the New Orleans Item speculated on the approaching congressional race in the Seventh District, listing some of the candidates it felt would seek the Democratic nomination.  Percy T. Ogden of Crowley was mentioned as a possible candidate although he had not announced for the post.  The Item remarked, “William Polk of Rapides is exercising his political legs,” and “Congressman Pujo will be given many an opportunity to point with pride to the noble stand he took in the Mermentau dam controversy.”  The Lake Charles Daily American-Press sprang to Pujo’s defense, saying, “Mr. Pujo and his friends have every reason to feel proud of what the Item so sarcastically terms ‘his noble stand!...'”  The pro-Pujo American Press contended that Pujo played the role of peacemaker in finding a solution to the controversy, and ended it editorial by remarking:

We ask the Item if Mr. Pujo’s “noble stand” in this matter is not entirely proper and fair.  Or does the Item believe that Mr. Pujo should have either furnished the dynamite to destroy the dam or led a military expedition against the Cameron farmers who objected to the dam. (65) 

Pujo formally announced for re-election to Congress on July 18, 1910, in an article which listed his ranking in the House and cited the accomplishments of his first four terms in office.  He ranked third in years of service in the Louisiana delegation, was the ranking minority member of the Committee on Banking and Currency.  During his four terms in Congress he had secured more than a million dollars for improvements in the district.  This, wrote one paper, was “more than all the money expended by the government in this section of Louisiana during the century of American rule before Mr. Pujo’s election.” (66)

Only two candidates filed for Congress in addition to Pujo, James J. Bailey, a St. Landry Parish attorney and former member of the Louisiana legislature, and David John (Kinney) Reid, sheriff of Calcasieu Parish.  The Colfax Chronicle said Reid’s candidacy was a surprise to some voters, remarking:

A long feud has existed between Mr. Reid and Mr. Pujo, and the general impression is that the sheriff, who has a remarkable hold on the voters of Calcasieu, has simply got into the game to assist in the defeat of the congressman. (67)

Reid based his candidacy on the conviction that individualism in America was rapidly being replaced by the oppression of capitalism.  Associating Pujo with the giant corporations, he remarked:

When the last straw of oppression is laid on the people’s backs by faithless Congressmen in the interest of the Mighty Corporations, for whom they work and to whom they pray, then the struggle will begin, which before it ends will sprinkle the door lintel of every home with the blood of father, son or brother.  This day may not arrive in your or my life time, but unless a halt is called, it will surely come. (68)

He said he conceded Pujo was a capable lawyer; else he would not represent “about thirty-six to forty corporations.”

Bailey also attacked Pujo’s legal associations and discredited Pujo’s accomplishments in the Seventh District, maintaining that other members of the Louisiana delegation were responsible for them.  At Jennings, Bailey said Pujo had cost Calcasieu Parish many thousands of dollars when he defended the Union Sulphur Company. (69) 

None of the aspirants for Congress had a monopoly on criticism and accusations. Bailey, accused of being the candidate of the Sanders administration, claimed he knew nothing of the charge, but if so he was “glad of it.” (70)  Some of Bailey’s opponents claimed he was not a resident of the Seventh District, but was a citizen of Baton Rouge; he formally denied this second charge which apparently had no basis in fact.  Neither Pujo nor Bailey had much to say about Reid, both perhaps feeling that Reid was not a serious contender.

Pujo had the backing of many prominent Lake Charles leaders, among them District Attorney Joseph Moore, Judge D. B. Gorham, and attorneys Jerry D. Cline, A. R. Mitchell, Alfred M. Barbe, Percy C. Smith, Frank E. Powell, J. B. Kent, and J. W. Baker. (71)  Official returns in September indicated the success of the contest, Pujo getting a majority vote and carrying five of the eight parishes in the district.  He polled 5,467 votes, Bailey 3,617, and Reid 590.  Calcasieu Parish had shown renewed faith in Pujo by giving him the largest vote in the district, 1,643 votes to 501 for Bailey and 374 for Reid.  Bailey carried Avoyelles, St. Landry, and Vernon parishes; concerning St. Landry, the Crowley Daily Signal remarked, “The greatest surprise of the election was the close run in St. Landry (Bailey, 874, Pujo, 815), Mr. Bailey’s home parish.”  Pujo was declared the nominee of the Democratic Party by the congressional committee which met in Alexandria on September 22. (72)

J. R. Jones, candidate for the Socialist Party, was Pujo’s only opponent for the general election.  Jones planned to make the campaign an active one, touring all important areas in the district.  An article evaluating the effectiveness of the Socialist Party efforts in the state remarked:

In November J. R. Jones (a Red) challenged Congressman A. P. Pujo for his seat, but only in the upland and timber areas of the seventh district did he show strength, receiving but 706 votes to his opponent’s 7,393. (73)

Pujo carried every parish in the district in the general election, polling his largest vote again in Calcasieu, where he polled 241 votes. (74)

The Democratic Party had been successful in congressional races throughout the nation, and in April, 1911, the first Democratic House in sixteen years convened in Washington for a special session to consider the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty.  Though the Democrats held a majority in the House, Pujo’s party remained a minority in the Senate.  Pujo’s ranking position on the Committee on Banking and Currency resulted in his being named to the chairmanship of the committee, and, in addition, he was placed on the Committees on Reform in Civil Service and Irrigation of Arid Lands.  Champ Clark was elected Speaker of the House; Pujo had voted for Clark in 1909, and did so again in 1911. (75)

When the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty came up for its second vote in the House April 21, 1911, Pujo voted against it as he had done earlier.  The bill passed the House, however, by a vote of 264 to eighty-nine.  Representatives Broussard and Estopinal of Louisiana changed their stand on the measure and voted for the bill on the second vote.  The bill passed the Senate fifty-three to twenty-seven on July 22. (76)

President Taft had made the Canadian agreement with Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier of Canada, and now that the treaty had been ratified by the United States the only step remaining before the treaty could be put into operation was approval by Canada.  The final step was never realized, however, because Laurier and his Liberal Party were defeated in the Canadian elections of September, 1911.  The New York Times reported:

 The Liberal Government of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and with it the Taft reciprocity agreement between the United States and Canada, was overwhelmingly defeated in the elections held to-day…

 In Ontario, the leading province of Canada, where the anti-reciprocity sentiment was the strongest, the Conservatives made almost a clean sweep. (77)

Pujo introduced numerous bills which called for waterway improvements throughout the Seventh District, the major one calling for an additional appropriation for the intracoastal canal from the Mermentau to Sabine rivers.  Congress authorized $190,000 for completion of the canal and appropriated $100,000 to continue work already started.  Two Pujo bills requested improvement of navigation on the Calcasieu and Mermentau rivers and Bayou Plaquemine Brule; no appropriation was made for the Calcasieu, but $21,200 was appropriated for the other two waterways. (78) 

Pujo had persistently advocated an extension to the post office at Alexandria, introducing a bill to that effect five times, and in 1913, his efforts culminated in an appropriation of $65,000 for the project.  He was also successful in getting $10,000 for continuing the Federal building at Crowley; he did not succeed in getting a continuing appropriation for the building at Jennings. (79)

 CHAPTER V

THE MONEY TRUST INQUIRY

The  single most notable event of Pujo’s career was the Money Trust Investigation of 1912 - 1913, an investigation created for the purpose of determining whether there existed in the United States any combination of financial interests detrimental to trade.  From his early years in Congress, Pujo had demonstrated an adeptness in financial matters and had been a member of the House Committee on Banking and Currency during his entire congressional career.  Because of his seniority on the committee, he was named its chairman in 1911; as chairman he elected to head the Money Trust Investigating Committee.

Before discussing the work of the investigation, it is necessary to discuss briefly the part Pujo played in the national Monetary Commission.  This government entity (also formed to investigate the financial structure of the United States), created by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908, was instructed to determine,  through inquiry and investigation, what changes were necessary in the monetary system of the United States.  Senator Nelson W. Aldrich was chairman of the commission. (1) 

Broad powers were given the commission,  not only in order that it might thoroughly investigate banking in the United States, but so it also might analyze banking and currency conditions in Europe and Asia.  Hearings and examinations were held in this country; members of representatives of the commission conducted investigations in foreign areas; papers and monographs were prepared by experts in banking; statistical information was collected from national and state banks and trust companies, national bank examiners, and state bank supervisors; and all findings, reports, hearings, and publications were collected and later deposited in the library of Congress.

One of the serious handicaps facing the commission was the absence of literature of American banking, the only literature available being obsolete accounts of state banks existing before the Civil War and works dealing with the history of national banking legislation.  For this reason, the commission employed experts to bring the history of American banking up to date.  Because of the absence of English-language literature dealing with banking in Europe and Asia, the commission compiled and published data regarding banking practices in England, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, Mexico, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Holland, and Japan. (2)

Three years after its inception, the commission was not yet ready to make its final report to Congress, a situation which prompted criticism from some congressional sources.  Earlier, in November, 1910, The Nation magazine reported that the commission would probably not construct, propose, consider, and enact, in that short interval (end of Sixty-First Congress), so complicated a scheme of legislation as the reform of the banking system.”   The magazine said that views of individual members of the commission were not known in 1910 and added “it is high time that the Monetary Commission…should take measures toward some definite proposition or propositions.” (3)

In August, 1911, Senate Bill 854 was introduced requiring a report from the commission on January 8, 1912, and repealing sections of the Aldrich – Vreeland Act creating the commission, the repeal to take effect the same day as the final report.  During discussion of the bill in the Senate and House, it was noted the commission had cost the government $207,130.46 up to March 31, 1911.  Publications of the commission had cost $86,861.92, the largest single item in the list of expenses.  Republican Senator Albert B. Cummins of Iowa said the publications would not be read and contained no information of value for legislation. (4)  Cummins’ statement had merit judging from the volumes of information found in the commissions’ publications.

At chairmen of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Pujo handled Senate Bill 854 when it was introduced in the House.  It was during the House discussion of the bill that some indication of Pujo’s part in the commission’s work was indicated.  He had attended informal meetings of the commission, but the commission held no formal meetings until autumn of 1911. (5)   When the commission was created in 1908, minority members of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Pujo being one of them, had filed a report opposing creation of the commission, a report felt justified in 1911 by the cost of the commission and its failure to make any recommendations to Congress. (6)  Some Republican members of the commission defended the commission’s work; Vreeland said the commission had cost the government less during its existence than was paid by the government to remove snags from the Mississippi River during the same period of time, “doubtless a very useful work," but insignificant when compared to the benefit to be had from commission findings and recommendations.  Senate Bill 854 passed the House of August 19, 1911, and became law August 22, 1911. (7)

The report of the commission, submitted in 1912, contained a history of the commission’s work, a list of defects in the banking system in the United States, and a bill which recommended creation of the National Reserve Association of the United States. (8)

The National Reserve Association Bill was introduced in Congress, but had never been reported out of either house.  Democrats controlled the House in 1912, and the National Monetary Commission was a brainchild of the Republican Party; the commission had been denounced by Democrats from its beginning, and the Progressives of Democrats were generally dissatisfied with the commission report.  One writer of the period said of the report:

(It) fell upon a House wholly alienated from the personal control, and from the party which had been dominate when the commission was created; while in the Senate nearly as much hostility to its work was manifested. (9)
 

The work and findings of the National Monetary Commission were not altogether fruitless.  The publications it sponsored provide a monumental source for students of banking and currency of the early twentieth century; its findings served as a guide for later legislation on banking currency; and its recommendations were adopted in modified form in the Federal Reserve of 1913. (10)  One evaluation of the commission stated:

Whatever may be the legislative outcome of the Commission’s labors, it has already performed a notable service by gaining fresh and diffusing old knowledge of the subjects with which it deals. (11)

Unlike the National Monetary Commission, so one event was responsible for the creation of the Pujo Money Trust Investigating Committee; rather it was created in response to a number of related circumstances.  Beginning about 1873 and continuing into the twentieth century, a suspicion began to grow among agricultural-debtor spokesman throughout the country that a dangerous combination of financial interests had been formed in New York City and in other large cities of the United States.  These spokesmen, finding that the Democratic and Republican parties were not meeting the needs of the agricultural-debtor classes, united in the People's or Populist Party.  The party did not survive, but many of the reforms it advocated eventually became the law of the land, while the suspicions that the party fostered resulted in bringing to light many of the evils of American society in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  One account states:

When, in the later eighties and in the “heart-breaking nineties,” hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions - of men found themselves either without work to do or, having work, unable to pay their just debts and make a living, the Populists held that there must be “wrong and crime and fraud somewhere.”  What was more natural than to fix the blame for this situation upon the manufacturers, the railroads, the money-lenders, the middlemen - plutocrats all, whose “colossal fortunes, unprecedented in the history of mankind,” grew ever greater, while the multitudes came to know the meaning of want. (12)

Although the Populists were criticized for their attitude toward banking and currency, John Hicks in The Populist Revolt remarked:

The Populists observed with entire accuracy that the currency of the United States was both inadequate and inelastic.  They criticized correctly the part played by the national banking system in currency matters as irresponsible and susceptible of manipulation in the interest of the creditor class. (13)

It was to the government that the Populists looked for help; in addition, they wanted more personal control of government.  Progressive measures adopted in the early part of the twentieth century helped to fulfill their desires.

Allen Nevins said of this period in American history:  

 …public opinion was decidedly nervous over the darker possibilities of monopoly.  The exposure of the Tweed Ring in New York with which Jim Fisk and Jay Gould of the Erie were involved, and the Credit Mobilier scandal, had caused many to associate industrial combinations with political “rings” and to feel a stern hostility to both…Editors, legislators, and plain citizens…were ready to turn sharply upon any combination which seemed both wicked and vulnerable. (14)

Suspicions of many groups were confirmed with the writings of the Muckrakers, writers who concerned themselves with exposing the evils of American society.  Magazines such as McClure’s, Munsey’s, Cosmopolitan, American, and Collier’s published exciting stories of the lawlessness of the beef barons and the lumber kings.  Of muckraking, Nevins said, “The recipe was open to all, and supply and demand interacted perhaps more clearly than at any other time in our magazine history.” (15)

It was at the close of this period that Representative Charles A. Lindbergh of Minnesota expressed public concern over a possible “money trust;” on December 4, 1911, he introduced a resolution in Congress asking for the appointment of a committee “to investigate as to whether there are not combinations of financial and other concerns who control." (16)  Samuel Untermyer, a New York attorney, delivered a speech entitled “Is There a Money Trust?” before the Finance Forum of New York on December 27, 1911. Ida Tarbell said of the Untermyer speech:

(Untermyer) proceeded to tell a really alarming story of the power over money and credit and so over all industry…The story was more appalling because it was calm and coherent and so obviously backed by a very large familiarity with the operations he was discussing. (17)

A month after his speech, Untermyer was called before the House Committee on Rules which was discussing the Lindbergh resolution.

Representative Robert S. Henry of Texas, chairman of the Rules Committee wanted a special committee to conduct the Money Trust Investigation.  But Pujo was determined that his committee would conduct the inquiry.  A Democratic Party caucus met February 7, 1912 to decide the issue; by a vote of 115 to 66, it was decided the standing committee would handle the investigation.  Meanwhile, Democratic Party leaders were debating whether an investigation would be desirable with the presidential election scheduled for November, 1912.  Confident of victory following years of Republican executive control, presidential hopefuls Champ Clark, William Jennings Bryan, and Woodrow Wilson decided that the investigation would not be harmful to Democratic chances.  (18)  Woodrow Wilson said of the money monopoly:
 

The greatest monopoly in the country…is the money monopoly.  So long as that exists our old variety and freedom and individual energy of development are out of the question.  The industrial nation is controlled by its system of credit.  This is the greatest question of all, and to this statesmen must address themselves with an earnest determination to serve the long future and true liberties of men. (19)

Bryan, like Henry, wanted a special committee to conduct the investigation.  Before the decision was made to let the Committee on Banking and Currency conduct the inquiry, Bryan said:
 

Democrats, beware!  The money trust having failed in its effort to prevent an investigation is now trying to force an investigation by the Banking Committee.  The fact that the money trust wants that committee entrusted with the investigation is proof positive that it thinks it can control that committee. (20)

Pujo resented the statement of Bryan, a man he had supported and admired for years; there was even speculation that Bryan would be called before the investigating committee to explain his statement.  In a public statement, Pujo presented his idea of what the investigation should encompass:

The resolution offered by Mr. Henry was, in a sense, revolutionary.  The legislative integrity of the House was questioned.  Special committees interfere with the orderly administration of National legislative affairs. 
 

I will introduce a resolution vesting the Banking and Currency Committee with plenary power for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a money trust in this country, and any one, rich or poor will have ample opportunity to appear and give such information as he may have.
 

The monetary system in this country is not a political but a scientific question.  I am sure I reflect the sentiment of the committee when I say this great subject will be considered along these lines. (21)

Plans had been long in the making for the investigation of a money trust, but finally on February 24, 1912, Henry introduced House Resolution 429 (Pujo Resolution) which asked authorization for the Committee on Banking and Currency to make a complete investigation of banking and currency conditions of the United States to determine what legislation was necessary to correct any defects in the country’s financial system.  Henry said the investigation could determine what groups, individuals, firms, national banks, and moneyed corporations had combined to gain control of railroads, industrial corporations, national banks and other moneyed institutions; whether these groups had used concentrated finances to regulate interest, to create, avert and compose panics, and to dominate the New York Stock Exchange and other clearing-house associations; whether these combinations engaged in dangerous speculation and crushed out competition; and what interlocking directorates existed in this country.  Financial concentration had created groups, said Henry, that could make “bull” and “bear” markets and “easy” and “tight” money.  He expressed the belief that a small financial group in New York City had formed a “money trust” and that the group was composed of not more than ten to twelve individuals. (22)

Only a handful of Republicans attacked the proposed investigation.  Some said it was planned for sensation, that it had been denounced in a Democratic caucus, that there was no money trust, and that the investigation proposal was a “humbug and sham.”  Vreeland said the investigation would be harmful for business, stating, “The reputation of a bank is as delicate as the reputation of a woman.  Many runs upon banks have been started by thoughtless or malicious remarks.” (23)  Dalzell said the resolution had been denounced by Bryan, that the committee was not given ample power, and that the National Monetary Commission had already made a thorough investigation. (24)

Pujo, defending the resolution and proposed investigation, said:

  …investigation of monetary and financial conditions in this country is presented as reflecting the judgment, the wishes, and the instructions of the responsible majority of this membership to the House and to the people of this country. (25)

Other Democrats were more vehement in their denunciation of Republican criticism of the proposed investigation, claiming the Republicans had never spoken on the subject and never would.  Henry remarked:
 

And this is the reason for your silence; these monopolies, combines, and trusts are the children of your own party - the outgrowth, the result of laws enacted by the Republican Party. (26)

After two hours of heated debate, overwhelming approval was given the resolution, the vote being 268 - 8.  All of the eight opponents were Republicans. (27)  Republican James R. Mann, Minority floor leader, announced his intention to support the resolution.  He said investigations should be conducted by sober, sensible men having the interest of their country at heart, and added:
 

That can be said of the members of the Banking and Currency Committee.  I congratulate the Democratic side for the first safe and sane move it has made since it came into the control of the House. (28)

The Committee on Banking and Currency was divided into two sub-committees.  Pujo directed one subcommittee assigned the investigation, while Carter Glass was chairman of the second group assigned the task of devising a reserve banking system.  Pujo had agreed to division of the committee, but the decision was said to be distasteful to the radical wing of the party.  The investigating committee was composed of seven Democrats and four Republicans.  With the exception of Pujo, who was serving his fifth term in the House, the other Democratic members of the committee were junior congressmen, all in their first term:  William G. Brown of West Virginia, Robert L. Doughton of North Carolina, Hubert D. Stephens of Mississippi, James A. Daugherty of Missouri, James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, and George A. Neeley of Kansas.  Republican members were Henry McMorran of Michigan (fifth term), Everis A. Hayes of California (fourth term), Frank E. Guernsey of Maine (third term), and William H. Heald of Delaware (second term).  Untermyer was named chief counsel for the committee, assisted by Edgar H. Farrar and later by G. Carroll Todd. (30)

Two months after the committee was granted authority to begin the investigation it was necessary for it to come back to the House and ask for additional powers.  Republicans had already said the original resolution was not broad enough in scope to result in an investigation that was really intended as a sincere effort on the part of the Democratic Party.  When Henry introduced House Resolution 504 (also called the Pujo Resolution) asking for additional authority, it was natural that Republicans would make capital of the situation.  Resolution 504 spelled out in definite terms the situations the committee would be able to investigate. (31)

In a discussion of the resolution, Pujo stated that Untermyer would no accept employment unless additional powers were granted the committee. Untermyer, as will be noted later, was a constant source of trouble to the committee.  Republican James R. Mann said:

The counsel he (Pujo) has employed is proposing to milk the money power and the corporations that he is seeking to investigate.

This is one of these “come-and-see-me” resolutions.  We have an important political campaign ahead of us.  There is need for money, for funds. They say to a corporation - because this gives power to examine into every proceeding of every corporation in the land they say to a corporation, “Come and show up everything you have ever done, or else put up the stuff.”  They say, “If you dare make a movement in favor of our political opponents we drag you up before the bar of our committee.” (32)

Speaking of Mann, Henry remarked, “I do not know of anyone better qualified to testify as to the process of milking the financial powers than the minority leader of the Republican Party." (33)  He implied that Mann feared a stronger resolution because he would have to “stand up and be investigated” with the Republican Party.  As with the earlier resolution, the vote was decisive, 241 - 15 for its adoption. (34)   

Passage of House Resolution 504, however, was not the final attempt to add to the authority of the investigation; Pujo sponsored a bill which, if adopted, would have given Congress visitorial powers into national banking associations.  When asked whether any banks had refused, but all questionnaires sent out had not yet been returned.  Discussion of this latter bill gave rise to added criticism of the investigation.  The New York Times in an editorial said:

It is no part of a lawmaker’s duty to arouse prejudice, in the manner of a pettifogger who might ask thunderingly, “When did you last beat your wife?” It was not proper for the committee to proceed as though it were prejudiced against the banks, whatever the fact may be, and it is not proper that in an argument over the committee’s procedure the Chairman should make assumptions in anticipation of proof differing little from insinuations of unlawful or impolitic procedure by the banks. (35)

Former House Speaker Joseph G. Cannon said he hoped the investigation was not intended for Democratic publicity purposes, but added:

I am not intimately acquainted with the gentleman from Louisiana (Pujo) but I have been his colleague, and I would be perfectly willing to concede, as far as he is concerned, that any investigation he would control would be conducted in the best of faith; not for political advantage, to be used in a presidential campaign, but in good faith to ascertain facts. (36)

Pujo said that although difficulties had not been encountered with any of the banks, the bill was but a preventive to any possible legal interference into the committee’s planned procedures.  The bill passed the House, but was reported unfavorably by the senate Committee on Finance. (37)

Having what Congress thought adequate authority to conduct a competent investigation, the Pujo Money Trust Investigating Committee held its first public hearing in Washington May 16, 1912.  Pujo’s role in the public hearings was one of judicial interpreter, who swore in witnesses, interpreted and ruled on procedures, maintained order in the proceedings, issued press releases, and was official spokesman for the committee membership.  Untermyer held the dominant position in the investigation; he was first to question each witness and his knowledge of finance and acquaintance with records and exhibits furnished by witnesses gave him the appearance of being over bearing at times.  Pujo stated that the investigation had been planned and was to be concise and sequential.  He said every member had a right to question witnesses, but said this would be done only after Untermyer had completed a certain line of questioning.  Concerning the testimony of witnesses, House Resolution 504 stated:

No person shall be excused from giving testimony or from answering any question or from otherwise disclosing any fact within his knowledge as an individual or as an officer or director of a corporation, or otherwise, or from producing any book, paper, or document on the ground that the giving of such testimony or the production of such book, paper or document would tend to incriminate him, or for an other reason; but every person so testifying shall be granted immunity from prosecution with respect to any matter or things concerning which he may be interrogated and as to which he shall truthfully make answer under oath upon such investigation. (38)

One writer said Untermyer’s tone of questioning “gave the hearings the aspect of a trial and put the representatives of the Stock Exchange and other New York institutions on the defensive.” (39) Ida Tarbell said of Untermyer’s questioning:

My own impression, after listening to it for a number of days, is that the criticism is largely due to sympathetic revulsion against the almost uncanny cleverness of it.  The ordinary hesitating uniformed mind finds it hard to forgive such preparedness, such astuteness, such cat-like springs.  It isn’t Christian to be so able!   ….On the whole it was to my mind entirely legitimate. (40)

In addition to criticism of Untermyer, some newspaper and magazines voiced their opposition to he investigation itself.  To The Nation, the Pujo Investigation was unfortunate for several reasons:  It should not have been conducted prior to a presidential campaign; there seemed to be a collision of authority between banks and the committee over cooperation in submitting reports of individual shareholders and the banks were right to refuse; and the relation of wealth to the clearing house and stock exchanges had already been investigated by the Hughes Special Committee of 1909.  The newspapers and magazines were not all opposed to the investigation, for many of the country’s leading newspapers and magazines praised the conduct and accomplishments of the inquiry.  Tarbell said the investigation was logical and effective and free of “irrelevant sensation;” witnesses were persons who knew the subject matter and not those who “suspected;" and the committee work was kept within manageable limits and the line of questioning was adhered to. (41)  Many of the evaluations of the committee did not appear in print until the investigation was completed, evaluations to be discussed following the committee report in this paper.

The committee selected eighteen of the largest banks and trust companies in the country, planning to consult members of these institutions in the hearings to determine their relation to railroads, insurance companies, producing and trading companies, public utilities, and other banks and trust companies.  New York institutions selected by the committee were J. P. Morgan and Company, First National Bank, Guaranty Trust Company, Banker’s Trust Company, National City Bank, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, National Bank of Commerce, Chase National Bank, Astor Trust Company, and Hanover National Bank; the Chicago institutions were Continental and Commercial Bank, First National Bank, and Illinois Trust and Savings Bank; the Boston institutions were Kidder, Peabody and Company and Lee, Higginson and Company. (42)

From June 6 to June 13, 1912, the committee hearings were held in New York.  At the first of these hearings, Pujo made his first statement to the press explaining the nature of the investigation.  He said the main part of the inquiry would not begin until autumn.  Some of the nation’s leading financial institutions insisted the committee had overstepped its power in demanding issuance of certain information which had been requested of them by the committee.  Once the committee’s power was recognized, Pujo said, it would then take time to gather and assimilate information submitted by these institutions.  The “prevalent impression” that the committee could do its job “by merely examining witnesses,” said Pujo, demonstrates the popular misconception of the character of the task and the constructive results sought to be obtained.  A second reason for postponing the main inquiry, he said, was the need to wait until the presidential election was over, so that public confidence in the committee would not be lost.  He said the intervening time would be used to take testimony on subjects which contributed to the main inquiry. (43)

The committee attempted to find out if there really was a money trust, if such a trust was conscious of itself, and how the trust explained itself.  Untermyer defined as money trust as:
 

…an established identity and community of interest between a few leaders of finance which has created and is held together through stock holding, interlocking directorates, and other forms of domination over banks, trust companies, railroads, public-service and industrial corporations, and which has resulted in vast and growing concentration and control of money and credit in the hands of a comparatively few men. (44)

On May 16, 1912 in Washington, the committee called the first of the ninety-two witnesses it was to hear throughout the investigation.  After this one hearing, the committee shifted to New York City.  Herman Sielcken, a member of the coffee importing and exporting firm of Crossman and Sielcken, was the first witness.  Information received by the committee indicated an attempt on the part of Sao Paulo, Brazil to corner the world’s coffee crop, eighty-five per cent of all produced in the world, $75,000,000 in bonds had to be issued and American firms had handled some of the bonds.  The committee wanted to find out what part J. P. Morgan and Company, the National City Bank, and the First National Bank, all of New York, had played in the transaction.  Sielcken admitted these firms had purchased part of the bonds, but denied any scheme was involved, saying the American firms were only being patriotic in helping an American neighbor.  The price of coffee had nearly doubled because of the plan, but Sielcken said prices had gone up  because of natural causes and was not a result of the plan to withhold coffee from the market.  He denied that a Coffee Trust existed in the United States. (45)

Hearings in New York in the early part of June were a measure of expediency; the committee wanted to look into the operations of the New York Stock Exchange and New York Clearing House and felt it better to be close to both institutions.  Of the New York hearings, The Nation magazine reported:
 

In the matter of the New York Clearing House it is quite safe to predict that the committee’s inquiry will clear the air and remove some wholly unwarranted misconceptions from the mind of the outside public. (46)

Editorially, the New York Times said:
 

Apparently the committee or its Chairman perceives some of these obvious things for it is announced that the line of inquiry will be shifted to the New York Clearing House and the Stock Exchange.  New York has no apologies to make for either institution….
 

The Clearing House saved the Nation in 1907, and for its trouble was roundly blamed as the author of the panic. (47)

William Sherer, manager of the New York Clearing House Association, was the major witness at the hearing in New York on June 6.  His testimony revealed the clearing house was practically controlled by five men, all leading New York bankers.  In addition, he testified that the clearing house received $17,100,000 annually for collection of out-of-town checks.  Untermyer called the clearing house an illegal combination “exercising ‘monstrous regulation’ over banking business” in the United States.

Untermyer, through testimony taken June 7, attempted to find out why the Oriental Bank of New York was forced to close in 1907.  Former directors of the bank were questioned; R. W. Jones, former president of the bank, produced a letter from Hugh Kelly, the man he succeeded as president, in which Kelly attributed closing of the bank to withdrawal of clearing house certificates from the bank.  Witnesses said the bank had been solvent, but a run was started when announcement was made that the certificates would be withdrawn.  James G. Cannon, president of the Fourth National Bank of New York and author of a book on clearing house procedures, admitted in testimony that clearing houses should be incorporated and supervised by the government. (48)

 
A. Barton Hepburn, president of the New York Clearing House association, appeared before the committee on June 11.  He admitted that withdrawal of clearing house certificate banks which had been forced to close was probably a mistake, but he placed the blame on Congress.  He said legislation was needed which would provide for a banking and currency system with a central reserve, a market for commercial paper and a flexible currency. (49) 

The committee began its investigation into the operations of the New York Stock Exchange on June 12 and 13 with the testimony of George W. Ely, secretary of the exchange, and Ransom H. Thomas, its president in 1907.  Thomas testified that when interest rates increased in October, 1907, J. P. Morgan relieved the situation by allowing the issue of $25,000,000 which in turn provided enough money to reduce the interest rates and remedy the money shortage. (50)  Shortly after Morgan had authorized the issue of additional money, the government responded by placing an approximately identical amount on deposit with New York banks.  On the last day of testimony preceding the presidential election, George B. Cortelyou,  Secretary of the treasury in 1907, was summoned as a witness for the purpose of determining how the government assistance was handled.  Cortelyou’s testimony revealed that he had discussed the government issue of money with the New York bankers prior to giving the order for its release. (51)

 The New York hearing on June 13 was the last until December because of the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections.  Following the first series of hearings, Pujo evaluated the accomplishment of the investigating committee in an article in the New York World.  He remarked:

The statement made herein is to be construed as reflecting my own personal views and not those of the full committee.

In my opinion the facts brought out by the examination of witnesses high in the financial world unquestionably justifies the action of congress in ordering the investigation…

Without having made a complete analysis, and relying largely upon my recollection of the testimony, I feel authorized in stating that some of the transactions were startling in their nature and are of great interest to the people.

Notably the first hearing in Washington disclosing the fact that at least two of our great financial institutions participated in a plan, or at least advanced many millions, where it was made possible to take off the market about 4,000,000 bags of coffee, about 1,000,000 of which are still stored in New York….

But more surprising was the testimony adduced, showing absolute control vested in the Clearing House Association over financial institutions of the city of New York and therefore the entire country.

The practical control of all the great financial institutions of New York, except one, by the clearing house, has resulted in demonstrating, from evidence brought out by the committee, the fact that the association has more power over the banks than has the government which created them. (52)

Pujo observed that many of the large banking institutions had refused to answer questionnaires sent out by the committee on the grounds that answers would violate the confidential relations between the banks and their customers; and yet, these same banks allowed the clearing house to examine their records.(53)

When hearings resumed December 9, Pujo issued a statement to the press in which he opined that many unauthorized reports had been circulated concerning the work and plans of the investigation, and he felt that the public should be warned about these inaccuracies and distortions. He said there had been a consistent, hostile effort to embarrass the committee, but there had been no friction or misunderstanding between members of the committee or between the committee and Untermyer.   Any statements made by the committee, he said, would not be and had not been made at any time other than that openly announced at the hearings.  He voiced the hope that the bill he sponsored giving the committee visitorial powers into national banks would be passed; however, he said, in the event it did not, the committee would submit an intermediate report and make its recommendations based on the information gathered up to the time.  He reiterated that the investigation was an inquiry and not a trial and, therefore, the witnesses, though they could confer with counsel, could not be represented by counsel on the witness stand. (54)

The committee questioned ten bankers and clearing house officials from Pittsburgh and Baltimore during the first hearing in December to determine what methods had been used in those areas for handling out-of-town checks and to examine the rules and regulations incorporated by these institutions. (55)  From the testimony of Walter E. Frew, president of the Corn Exchange Bank of Hempstead, New York and a director of the Bankers’ Trust Company of New York, the committee learned of voting trust existing in the Bankers’ Trust Company, made up of three men closely allied with Morgan interests.  In addition, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York had a similar trust consisting of men also identified with Morgan. Both banks had been very successful, and the six trustees were said to control $368,000,000 in deposits. (56)

Newspapers, meanwhile, continued to harass the committee.  On December 12, Pujo issued a statement denying that the committee was inconveniencing brokers on the New York Stock Exchange by detaining them for the investigation.  Some brokers in attendance, he said, had not been called for testimony until a specific day:  yet, some came early and others who were remaining had already be examined. (57)

The Nation magazine attributed declining prices at home and abroad during December to the Pujo Money Trust Investigation.  The magazine said many reasons could be found for the general air of despondency, but added:

It is undeniable that the financial atmosphere, so far as regards Wall Street itself, has been further obscured by the proceedings in the “Money Trust” investigation. (58)

Regardless of the views of some news media, many were coming to believe that the committee was doing worthwhile work, which was bringing to light many of the operations of the financial world. 

The most dramatic of the Money Trust hearings came on December 18 and 19 when J. Pierpont Morgan, senior member of the banking firm of J. P. Morgan and Company, appeared as a witness.  Morgan was reported by the New York Times as being weary when he took the stand, not having the “spruce look” he had when he appeared before the Senate committee investigating campaign funds in 1911.  His voice was low at times, but he could be heard distinctly. (59)  During the Morgan testimony Untermyer called attention to the business of the Morgan firm, saying it was a private banking institution, but one engaged in the same activities as national and state banks, except the issuance of money.  Also Morgan’s firm was not subject to government supervision.  Morgan denied having any financial control, claiming, “I want to control nothing.”  He said money could not be controlled and there was no such thing as a money trust. (60)

In January, 1913, when stock of the Chase National Bank of New York was transferred from control of the First National Bank, the committee felt elated over the transfer.  Some said the transfer was an attempt to outflank the committee, but members, although refusing to be quoted, felt they had gained a victory over a large financial combination.  George F. Baker was chairman of the board of directors of the First National Bank and a close financial ally of Morgan. (61)

During January, the committee began to receive favorable comment in the nation’s press.  The Literary Digest reported:

Most editors agree that the committee has already brought to light a degree of financial centralization to which the public can not afford to be indifferent, that its continued investigations are of great educational value, and that its work is an essential preliminary to whatever remedial legislation may be necessary. (62)

The Nation magazine stated:

No one is likely to deny that many highly important facts - largely kept secret hitherto, and bearing on a position of affairs which, in one way or another, must some day be dealt with in sober restrictive legislation - have been brought to light on the basis of authoritative testimony. (63)

Outlook magazine said the committee had accomplished more than the public thought it would when it began its work, and added:
 

But it is only fair to say that the committee, while some of its hearings have undoubtedly been sensational and political, has made public some facts, resting on the best evidence, regarding American finance and financiers which must inevitably be of great social, economic, and legislative value in the future. (64)

George F. Baker was a witness on January 8, and his testimony was probably the most gratifying to the investigators.  He saw nothing wrong with voting trusts, but he admitted that concentration and control of credit had gone far enough. (65)   The New York Times noted that “Baker’s words surprised not only the investigators, but the members of his own party.” (66)

George W. Perkins, former member of the J. P. Morgan firm, was probably the most difficult of witnesses to appear before the investigating committee.  On January 15, when Perkins was asked to give his occupation, he told Untermyer he was a student of economics and “possibly, spending most of my time testifying before congressional committee might be another occupation.” (67)   Perkins did admit the New York Stock Exchange should be incorporated under a Federal law, claiming he was a Nationalist on these matters, not a states rights man.  He agreed that concentration was prevalent in American society and that it existed in all forms of life. (68)  Perkins did say there was danger in concentration of any kind, particularly if that concentration was unregulated and unsupervised.  He summed up his feelings on trusts and concentration when he said:
 

We have had one thing after another down here in Washington.  We started it up in New York with the insurance investigation a few years ago, and, in my judgment, we have gone in every case from the frying pan into the fire.

Take these securities that have been transferred to some of these banks and insurance companies.  The Armstrong committee in New York objected to the insurance companies taking them, and therefore the banks bought them.  Now, they object to the bankers holding them, and the poor securities have no place to rest their heads.  Take the Standard Oil Co.   It is supposed that we have disintegrated the Standard Oil Co. Are we better off as a people because we have smashed the Standard Oil Co.? (69)   Those are some of the things that we have not been able to work out yet.

George M. Reynolds, president of the Continental Commercial National Bank of Chicago, appeared before the committee on January 16.  He had a difficult time explaining a statement he had made in a speech before the National Business Congress in 1911.  There he had said, “I believe the money power now lies in the hands of a dozen men; and I plead guilty to being one, in the last analysis, of those men. (70)  He claimed he talked extemporaneously before the Congress and should have been more explicit, but went on to say he had reiterated the statement fifty times since the address.  He explained:
 

What I was trying to say was that I did not believe that the bankers of the country generally were combined together and had secret meetings to control and influence this thing called money and credit.  What I meant to say was that, under our national banking laws, requiring that the National banks in three central cities should carry a reserve of the National banks of the rest of the country, there was a natural concentration of the money power or the power to issue credit against reserve, which they would carry, in the hands of a few men.  What I meant by saying that I was one of them was this:  Our bank probably carries a larger percentage of accounts of outside banks then any other institution in America, both in number and volume.  I meant to say that I was conscious of the responsibility that that placed upon me, and was urging currency legislation which would correct any faults that existed. (71)

Jacob H. Schiff, senior member of the banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company of New York, followed Reynolds as a witness.  According to the New York Times, the committee was pleased with his testimony and thought about making it the basis of a part of its report. (72) Schiff made it clear he did not favor any legislation which would restrict individual freedom.  He did say he favored national banks doing any legitimate banking business including syndicate underwriting, promoting, and issuing notes; they should not engage in stock transactions, but high-grade bond purchases could be allowed; officers and individual directors should not borrow from the bank because they might be able to exert influence in their favor; minority stockholders should have representation on the board of directors, but this should not be guaranteed through legislation unless a firm refused to give the representation; and assets of banks and stock companies should be published because publicity helped banking institutions.  Schiff said he did not believe in concentration through companies, only through individuals. (73) A letter from Schiff to the committee on January 24 said:
 

If I had the opportunity, in any proper answer to your questions, I should not have hesitated to state that the multiplication of banks and trust companies has heretofore led to an overextension of credit, to overtrading, and to illegitimate conditions in general, and that the financial panic of 1907 and other financial depressions that have preceded it have largely been brought on by the too great multiplication of banks and trust companies. (74)

Early in the investigation, William Rockefeller, younger brother of John D. Rockefeller and director in a number of corporations, was subpoenaed as a witness, but he could not be located for some time. Charles F. Riddel, sergeant of arms of the House, testified on December 18, 1912, that three messengers had tried to serve the subpoena, but each time they were told Rockefeller was sick, out of town, in Canada, or some other place than his home.  Untermyer said Rockefeller would be questioned about the copper market manipulations in 1907 and about the amalgamated Copper Company transactions which occurred at the same time the Globe Bank in Boston failed. (75)

Dr. Walter F. Chappell wrote to Pujo in December, saying that Rockefeller was under his care and was suffering from chronic throat trouble.  On January 16, the committee adopted a resolution that Pujo and Untermyer take testimony in the Rockefeller home.  Pujo opposed the resolution, and said, “I voted against the resolution because I considered the report of Dr. Richardson as a whole to establish a different set of facts from that believed by others of the committee. (76) 

On February 7, 1913, Pujo and Untermyer, acting for the whole committee, interviewed Rockefeller at Jekyl Island, Georgia.  Untermyer asked that Rockefeller and his physician advise him at any time they felt the examination should be discontinued.  Rockefeller’s testimony lasted only about twelve minutes.  Rockefeller’s physician asked that the questioning be stopped because there existed a danger of a spasm of the larynx which might choke the witness.  Pujo said in view of the statement of the physician and condition of Rockefeller the hearing would be adjourned.  (77)  Pujo had been placed in a precarious position and the New York Times reported:

Mr. Pujo had felt the experience keenly.  After hearing the opinions of the physicians concerned, he had voted in the Money Trust Committee against the attempt to take Mr. Rockefeller’s testimony.  He had consented to act only because the committee as a whole had taken the position that Mr. Rockefeller’s avoidance of the process of the committee had practically made an issue between the Government and a rich man, and the Government could not confess itself powerless in such a case. (78)

Pujo, in a statement to the press, said Rockefeller’s condition was “pitiable” and if anything had happened to Rockefeller he would never forgiven himself. (79)

A resolution to increase the allocation for the Money Trust Committee was introduced in the House February 11, 1913.  Originally $25,000 had been appropriated and $35,000 more was needed to cover added expenses.  The major objection to the additional appropriation was that it was requested only after the committee had obligated itself; the resolution was approved by a vote of 130 to 117.  The largest expense of the committee was a $15,000 salary paid to Untermyer; office expenses were $10,930, the second largest item. (80)

The committee had hired statisticians at the beginning of the investigation for the purpose of assimilating the numerous reports submitted to the committee by financial institutions.  Reports had been submitted throughout the hearing and this assimilation had been taking place continuously.  The Pujo Money Trust Investigating Committee had held its last hearing February 26, 1913; its report was completed February 27 and was made public February 28. (81)

CHAPTER VI

THE PUJO REPORT

Your committee is satisfied from the proofs submitted, even in the absence of data from the banks, that there is an established and well defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders of finance, created and held together through stock ownership, interlocking directorates, partnership and joint account transactions, and other forms of domination over banks, trust companies, railroads, and public service and industrial corporations, which has resulted in great and rapidly growing concentration of the control of money and credit in the hands of these few men. (1)

Thus reads a portion of the conclusion drawn by the subcommittee of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, assigned the task of determining whether or not there existed in the United States in 1912 a combination of financial interests commonly called a “money trust.” The committee drew the conclusion only after it made clear a number of points that would prevent the report from being misinterpreted or misunderstood.

One of these points was the distinction between concentration of the volume of money and the concentration of control over this volume of money. As stated by the committee:
 

An increasing proportion of the banking resources of the country might be concentrating at a given point at the same time that control of such resources at that point was spreading out in a wider circle. (2)

The committee said it was not directly concerned with the concentration of the volume of money at certain points, since this was due to the provisions of the national banking laws permitting banks to deposit in central reserve cities. (3)  The committee felt it absurd to suggest that control of the bulk of the widely distributed wealth of the country could be controlled by any one group of men.  Indeed such an idea was “impossible” and “ridiculous.”  Nevertheless it was not necessary that a group of men should “directly control the small savings in the banks nor the scattered resources of the country in order to monopolize the great financial transactions or to be able to dictate the credits that shall be extended or withheld from the more important and conspicuous business enterprises.”  “This,” said the committee “represents the existing condition.” (4)

During its inquiry, the Pujo Committee had sent 30,000 questionnaires concerning financial operations and associations to national banks and state banks and trust companies.  Only about 12,000 of these were returned.  Most  of the banks refused to comply with committee requests on the basis of Section 5241 of the national banking laws, which said no banking association was subject to visitatorial powers other than those prescribed by the national banking laws or those vested in courts of justice. (5) Wanting to give the committee those visitatorial powers, Pujo tried unsuccessfully to change Section 5241.

The failure of the banks to comply with committee requests was not the committee’s only hindrance.  The Comptroller of the Currency also refused to aid the committee.  Because of the absence of any court decision giving the committee authority to obtain access to the books of the national banks, the committee said it was “seriously embarrassed.”  The interval between the time the committee started the investigation and the resumption after the presidential election of 1912 was another reason why the report was far less complete than the committee had hoped it would be.  Many witnesses the committee had hoped to examine did not testify.  With Congressional adjournment approaching, the committee chose to submit an intermediate report rather than a complete one.  Nevertheless, the only further investigation it recommended was that of concentration of the control of money and credit. Stock exchanges and clearing houses needed no further investigation. (6)

The question of whether or not the committee found a money trust hinges on the definition of the term.  The committee noted:
 

If by such a trust is meant a combination or arrangement created and existing pursuant to a definite agreement between designated persons with the avowed and accomplished object of concentrating unto themselves the control of money and credit, we are unable to  say that the existence of a money trust has been established in that broad bald sense of the term although the committee regrets to find that even adopting that extreme definition surprisingly many of the elements of such a combination exists.

The committee concluded:
 

If, therefore, by a “money trust” is meant - an established and well-defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders of finance which has been created and is held together through stock holdings, interlocking directorates, and other forms of domination over banks, trust companies, railroads, public-service and industrial corporations, and which has resulted in a vast and growing concentration of control of money and credit in the hands of a comparatively few men - your committee, as before stated, has no hesitation in asserting as the result of its investigation up to this time that the conditions thus described exists in this country to-day. (7)

The community of interest which the committee said existed was divided into four groups.  First was the inner group composed of J. P. Morgan and Company, the recognized leader of the combination.  Included in this group were George F. Baker and James Stillman, individually, as well as through their connection with the First National Bank, the National City Bank, the National Bank of Commerce, the Chase National Bank, the Guaranty Trust Company, and the Bankers Trust Company.  Total resources of these corporations were said to be in excess of $1,300,000,000.

Closely allied with the inner group were the international banking houses of Lee, Higginson and Company, and Kidder, Peabody and Company with its three affiliated banks in Boston.  The third group was the banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, which the committee said was only “qualifiedly allied” with the inner group; however, it had many interests in common with the inner group and had what amounted to an understanding not to compete.  Chicago banking houses made up the fourth group.  The inner group was said to have a connection with these banks through the issuance of securities in joint account or participation at times in the underwriting of security issues. (8)

 The committee stated that beyond these inner groups and subgroups were banks and bankers who cooperated with them in underwriting or guaranteeing the sale of securities offered to the public and the distribution of these securities. 

Resources of the banks and trust companies of New York City in 1911 were $5,121,245,175, which was 21.73 percent of the total banking resources of the country, as reported to the Comptroller of the Currency.  In 1911, the twenty largest banks and trust companies in New York City held 42.97 percent of the total resources of the city.  This figure compared with 38.24 percent in 1906 and 34.97 percent in 1901. (9)

The committee listed five methods of concentration used by the four groups of financial associations: (10)
 

1. Through consolidations of competitive or potentially competitive banks and trust companies.

2. Through the same powerful interests becoming large stockholders in potentially competitive banks and trust companies.

3. Through interlocking directorates.

4. Through the influence which the more powerful banking houses, banks, and trust companies secured in the management of insurance companies, railroads, producing and trading corporations, and public utility corporations, by means of stockholdings, voting trusts, fiscal agency contracts, or directorships. 

5. Through partnership or joint account arrangements between a few of the leading banking houses, banks, and trust companies, in the purchase of security issues of the great interstate corporations.  

How did the committee know of the methods and existence of this concentration?   It stated that witnesses of the highest qualifications admitted that a rapid concentration of the sources of credit in the forms the committee described was taking place.  The committee did say that J. P. Morgan was not one of those who admitted concentration. (11)

The eighteen firms investigated by the committee held 385 directorships in forty-one banks and trust companies, with total resources of $3,832,000,000 and total deposits of $2,834,000,000 fifty directorship in eleven insurance companies having total assets of $2,646,000,000; 155 directorships in thirty-one railroad systems having a total capitalization of $12,193,000,000 and a total mileage of 163,200; six directorships in two express companies and four directorships in one steamship company with a combined capital of $245,000,000 and gross income of $97,000,000; ninety-eight directorships in twenty-eight producing and trading companies having a total capitalization of $3,353,000,000 and total gross annual earnings in excess of $1,145,000, 000; and forty-eight directorships in nineteen public utility corporations having a total capitalization of $3,583,000,000 and total gross annual earnings in excess of $1,145,000,000; and forty-eight directorships in nineteen public utility corporations having a total capitalization of $2,826,000,000 and total gross annual earnings in excess of $428,000,000.   These eighteen firms had a total of 746 directorships in 134 corporations having total resources or capitalization of $25,325,000,000. (12)

Showing an understanding of the concentration which it exposed, the committee stated:

We are not unmindful of the important and valuable part that the gentlemen who dominate this inner group and their allies have placed in the development of our prosperity.  There should be no disposition to hamper their activities if a situation can be brought about where their capital, prestige, and connections can be independently employed in free and open competition.  Without the aid of their invaluable enterprise and initiative and their credit and financial power the money requirements of our vast ventures could not have been financed in the past, and much less so in the future. (13)

Twenty-one recommendations made by the committee regarding the concentration of control of money and credit give an indication of the specific phases of the national banking system which it found deficient. (14)

The first recommendation asked that two or more banks not be permitted to consolidate unless the consolidation was approved by the Comptroller of the Currency.  To carry out the recommendation, it would be necessary to give the comptroller sufficient power to forbid consolidation when he felt it would result in undue concentration of control.

It was in the area of interlocking directorates that the committee was most productive.  The charts and diagrams produced by committee statisticians vividly illustrate the connection between the large banking institutions and other large business corporations.  But since the committee was primarily concerned with banking, it only recommended the interlocking directorates be restricted so that no person could be a director in more than one national bank serving the same community or locality.

The committee felt that no part of the stock of any national bank should be permitted to be owned or held directly or indirectly by any other bank or by any trust or holding company.  Voting trusts, the committee stated, should be prohibited. Cumulative voting was the system preferred by the committee.  For example, at the elections for directors of national banks, each stockholder should have votes equal to the number of his shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected.  These votes could be cast solidly for one director or distributed among several, depending on the choice of the shareholder.

The committee recommended that stockholders of a national bank should be prohibited from becoming associated as stockholders in any other corporation which, under agreement or arrangement, assured that the stock of the other corporation would always be owned by the same persons.  In the disposal of security issues of interstate corporations, the committee said , these corporations should not be allowed to enter into any agreements making any bank, banker, or trust company their sole fiscal agent.  Interstate corporation regulation was again the concern of the committee when it suggested that these corporations should not be permitted to deposit their funds with unsupervised, unregulated private bankers that did not disclose their resources or liabilities, that kept no reserve and that were free to invest their depositors’ money as they saw fit. 

Activities of national banks were further confined in the committee proposal asking that these banks be prohibited from directly or indirectly engaging in any promotion, guaranty, or underwriting which involved the purchase, sale, public offering, or issue of the securities of any corporation.  The committee thought national banks could be authorized to invest twenty-five percent of their capital in municipal and mortgage bonds of corporations.

Six committee proposals pertained to officers and directors of banks.  Officers should be prohibited from borrowing from their own banks.  Directors should only borrow after notice of their intentions to do so and only after this notice was included in the minutes of director meetings.  Banks officers’ transactions should be in their own names.  Participation by officers and directors in underwriting in which their banks were interested should be prohibited.  If an officer or director accepted or offered a reward for bank loans, his act should be regarded as criminal.  Finally, a bank should have no more than thirteen and no less than five directors.

Failure of the banks to cooperate with the committee no doubt influenced its final recommendation, that public inspection of assets other than the names of borrowers be allowed along with a list of stockholders.

The Pujo Committee made five recommendations regarding the 242 clearing house associations in the country. (15) Clearing houses should be incorporated and regulated.  The committee found the clearing houses to be like private clubs and subject only to the authority of their own governing bodies.  As a result, the success or failure of national banking institutions rested solely in private hands.  Members of the clearing houses should be examined by public authorities instead of by committees of the clearing house.  The committee termed the existing methods of examination to be illogical, unscientific, and superficial.

Until relief measures were provided by Congress, it would be permissible for clearing houses to issue clearing house certificates. These should be based on the security of members’ assets and should be circulated among members only to pay balances owed to each other at the clearing house.  The committee said clearing houses had issued certificates in 1893 and 1907, but they were issued without payment of circulation taxes.

The committee recommended regulating the amount that clearing houses charged for out-of-town checks; however, prescribed rates should be prohibited.  Finally, clearing houses should not be permitted to prescribe rates of interest or discount, rates of interest allowed on deposits, and rates of exchange.  Clearing houses, according to the committee, had assumed powers and functions wholly foreign to their original purpose.

Recommendations of the committee concerning stock exchanges pertained primarily to the use of mails, telephones, and telegraph.  It was recommended that Congress should prohibit the transmission of any of these means of any orders to buy or sell, or any quotations or other information concerning transactions on any stock exchange until certain conditions were met.  These were that exchanges should be incorporated; corporations whose securities were listed on the exchange should disclose any commissions paid to promoters, middle-men, or bankers; a margin of not less then twenty percent on all purchases of stock should be required; selling to inflate or depress the price of securities should be prohibited; exchanges should state in their charter the conditions under which securities were admitted or removed from the trading list; and exchanges should keep books of account showing the actual names of transactions of customers, giving access to these books to the Postmaster General. (16)

The committee ignored currency legislation in its recommendations, because legislation was in the hands of the subcommittee headed by Carter Glass. (17) The Pujo Committee’s recommendations were included in two bills that it drafted.  One contained amendments to the national banking laws, using the committee recommendations as a basis for these amendments.  The second provided that mails, telegraph, and telephones could not be used to further fraudulent and harmful transactions on a stock exchange. (18)

The seven Democratic members of the Pujo Committee signed the majority report.  Three of the four Republican members filed a minority report, and the fourth Republican, Henry McMorran, filed his individual views.

Minority members denied the existence of a money trust.  They did admit the investigation disclosed a dangerous concentration of credit in New Your City, and to some extent one in Boston and Chicago.  Many abuses admittedly had been brought out by evidence.  But the stock exchange and clearing house abuses could be corrected by the institutions themselves.

If they failed to do so, the states could then intervene.  Congress would intervene only in the event of state inaction.  Concluding their report, the minority members said:

While agreeing substantially with the majority upon many of the abuses to be corrected in the financial system, the stock exchange and the clearing-house associations, the undersigned have doubts as to the wisdom of some of the remedies proposed by the majority to correct these abuses. (19)

Congressman Henry McMorran disagreed with practically all the committee findings and recommendations.  He resented the methods used in the investigation, particularly that of not allowing committee members to interrogate witnesses.  The facts, he said, did not justify the sinister light thrown upon banking practices.  He commended clearing house methods and said the New York Stock Exchange had been faithful in its duties.  The evidence on control of money and credit was incomplete and misleading.  The fact that corporations were associated in some instances did mean they had control.  New York banks had multiplied; therefore, competition still existed.  McMorran called for a scientific banking plan and hoped the investigation would not divert Congress from such a plan.  He blamed an improper banking and currency system for clearing house abuses.  He saw no real evil in interlocking directorates.  He did agree with the committee on one point, its recommendation that officers not be allowed to barrow from their banks.  He concluded by saying the Comptroller of the Currency could safeguard the public from financial abuse.  If he could not the office should be abolished. (20)

Neither of the two bills recommended by the committee was enacted directly into law.  The committee recommendations did indirectly affect some measures passed by successing (sic) sessions of Congress.  General references, like the Dictionary of American Biography, credit the investigation with influencing passage of the Federal Reserve Act.  This is true only in the sense that committee findings disturbed many American citizens who in turn clamored for banking reform.  The resulting Federal Reserve Act was an indirect outgrowth of this public demand, but it was more directly the brainchild of the portion of the House Committee of Banking and Currency involved in finding a cure for banking evils.  It was not an outgrowth of the Pujo Investigating Committee.  The only legislation directly influenced by the investigation was the interlocking directorate prohibition of the Clayton Antitrust Act.  As Henry Parker Willis suggests:
 

The recommendations of the Money Trust Committee in general had no bearing upon banking or monetary reform and were accordingly given no attention by the sub-committee which was simultaneously working upon banking legislation and which later prepared a draft of what was to become the Federal Reserve Act. (21)
 

Willis felt that defective banking and currency legislation caused any undue concentration of money and credit control. The Money Trust Investigation, he said, only stimulated a belief that many of the financial evils of the country were the outgrowth of willful perversion of law, a belief Willis felt was unfounded.  He added:
 

It encouraged the belief that the existing evils were solely the product of designing men who, aided by irregular alliances with banks, were able to accomplish their objects at the expense of the nation.  It undoubtedly tended to create in the minds of members of Congress already prepared for it by many years of unsound currency philosophy a tendency to demand "strong" legislation directed against the “money power.”  This unquestionably rendered the task of adopting the Federal Reserve Act very much harder than it otherwise would been and probably introduced into the measure compromises on points of principle which else might not have been made. From every standpoint therefore the inquiry must be regarded as having been fundamentally injurious. (22)

Willis compared the effects of the inquiry to those of the National Monetary Commission.  The conservative elements of the monetary commission and the radical elements of the investigation neutralized one another and thereby cleared the field for broad legislation on banking and currency that followed. That in itself must, however, be termed a desirable result of the investigation, if it be true.  Willis did credit the investigation with one parcel of legislation:
 

The Money Trust Committee should be credited with having made recommendation for a provision designed to prevent national banks from entering into “any agreement, arrangement or understanding…having the purpose or effect of regulating its charges for collecting checks, drafts, notes or bills of exchange for its customers, or of fixing or regulating rates of interest or discount.”  (23)

Carter Glass said that the committee “created for a time a nation wide sensation,” but added that it “resulted in some far-reaching modifications of then-existing laws against trusts and illicit control of credits.” (24)

The New York Times agreed with the committee that it had found a money trust and that the trust might have made less money if it had had more competition.  The rest of the report was “rather dull and puzzling reading.”

The Times concluded:

The committee deals with fancied troubles, and with imaginary remedies.  It is out of its depth, and while wishing to do good would take great risks of doing harm. The gentlemen whose name the report bears will not be a member of the next Congress, and the submission of the report is likely to be the climax of his career.  It is well that we know the worst of the money trust on the very highest authority.  We now can sleep more calmly o'nights, sharing the repose which may be anticipated for the report. (25)

Thomas W. Lawson, muckraker and author of Frenzied Finance, felt the committee report was the most important report issued “since Congress was established.” (26)  Lawson, believing that “everyone should read it,” wanted to “put it into every graphophone in America, and its tables and charts into every moving-picture machine.”

Supreme Court justice Louis D. Brandeis, a personal friend of Woodrow Wilson, and participant in creation of the Federal Reserve Act, said the committee findings were clearly presented, making the conclusions drawn by the committee inevitable.  The committee, he said, “make a most important contribution toward attainment of the New Freedom.” (27)

Margaret G. Myers, author of the four-volume work, The New York Money Market, felt that little direct legislation resulted from the investigation, but did note that the light thrown upon the workings of the money market by the committee was reflected in the increased insistence on banking reform which did lead to the Federal Reserve Act.  She added that the hearings and report of the committee were a valuable source book on the financial organizations of American business in 1912. (28)

Charles C. Chapman, author of The Development of American Business and Banking Thought, 1913 - 1936, said the committee “confirmed Wilson’s assertion that the masters of the Government of the United States were the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the nation.”  The committee determined that the investment broker, in regard to stocks and bonds, became the maker, market, and dealer.  These functions, Chapman reported, resulted in the money trust. He said the investigation clearly demonstrated to the masses of the people that they were living under an “aristocracy of wealth.” (29)

Muckraker Ida Tarbell, who attended and followed the inquiry, termed it logical and effective.  She said it was free from sensation and the witnesses that appeared before the committee were qualified in their fields and not persons who were “suspected.”  She said work was kept within manageable limits and the method of inquiry made it possible to confine questioning to those terms under consideration. (30)

One contemporary evaluation said the method of investigation was “distasteful to a very large portion of the membership of both houses of Congress.”  Still the investigation called attention to the conditions of banking, and traces of the work it did would probably be found in future legislation.” (31)

Other critics condemned the committee for letting Samuel Untermyer assume such a dominating role in the inquiry.  The committee work and the report were said to be completely in Untermyer’s hands.  Some termed the report a partisan one, a judgment not wholly inaccurate since three separate views were filed in the report.  On one point most contemporaries of the period agreed:  The committee cleared the air and brought to light many hitherto unknown methods and transactions in use by the country’s financiers.

In summary, what can be said of the Pujo Trust Investigation?  As far as direct legislation is concerned, it accomplished nothing concrete.  It did bring to light many of the financial transactions previously unfamiliar to the average American.  This, in turn, led to increased public pressure for reform in the national banking laws.  This demand culminated in the Federal Reserve Act which corrected many of the existing evils of the banking and currency systems.

Critics must remember that the investigation was incomplete.  Some members of the committee, including Pujo, were not returning to Congress.  These men would lose any enthusiasm they might have mustered for the investigation.  Apparently the investigation had not helped them to be reelected and there was no need for them to be concerned about whether or not the committee recommendations were adopted.  The inquiry, as a part of the progressive period, must assume its place as one of the forces that helped to build the kind of New Freedom Woodrow Wilson inaugurated during his presidency.

CHAPTER VII

THE SENATE RACE AND RETIREMENT

Prior to the Money Trust Investigation, Pujo announced that he would seek a term in the United States Senate.  This was to be his last contest for public office.  Before relating the events of his Senate contest, it will be necessary to clarify the method by which Louisiana senators were then chosen.  The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for popular election of senators, would not become effective until May 31, 1913; prior to that time senators were chosen by the state legislatures.  Louisiana, however, in 1903 had adopted a modification of the old procedure for naming senators.  The Democratic State Central Committee in that year resolved that the party’s candidates for state office would be nominated by the direct primary method; in addition, part of the resolution stated:

Be it further resolved, etc., That at said primary election herein ordered, the voters at said election shall express their preference by casting a vote for some Democrat for United States Senator, to be elected by the Legislature which assembles in May, 1904; that any person receiving a majority of all the votes cast for said position of United States Senator shall thereby become the nominee of the Democratic party of the State of Louisiana for the office of United State Senator; and such majority of the direct votes cast at said primary shall be peremptory instruction to each member of the General Assembly, elected as a Democrat, to vote for such a person for said office of United States Senator. (1)  

Jared Y. Sanders, speaker of the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1903 and governor from 1908 to 1910, was a leading proposal (sic) was favored by the state and by the Legislature.  He admitted the Federal Constitution prohibited direct election of senators at that time, but said he felt the primary would obtain the same result without conflicting with the Constitution. (2) Louisiana had, therefore, with the adoption of the 1903 resolution placed the election of United States Senators in the hands of the people about ten years prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment. (3)

The first hint that Pujo would be a candidate for the Senate came in 1910 following a number of unusual circumstances.  Louisiana’s senior senator, Samuel McEnery, died in June 1910; under the provisions of the revised statutes of the United States, the governor was to appoint someone to fill the Senate vacancy unless the state legislature was in session, in which case the legislature would elect a senator.  The General Assembly was in session in June and July, 1910, and on July 5, elected Governor Sanders to fill the unexpired term.  Sanders accepted and made plans to take office later in the year. (4)

In August 1910, however, Sanders declined the Senate post and later made a statement explaining his position:

On Aug. 25, 1910, I was requested, in open letter, by many gentlemen intimately connected with the management of the World’s Panama Exposition Company not to accept the election to the United States Senate, but in the interest of the exposition, to continue to serve as governor.  On Aug. 27, 1910, in reply to this request, I addressed an open letter to Hon. T. P. Thompson, and others, setting forth fully my position in the matter, and stating that I would decline to qualify as United States senator, and would continue to act as governor. (5)

Since the legislature was not in session in August, Sanders named Judge John R. Thornton of Alexandria to the Senate vacancy; criticism of Sanders’ appointment resulted in his call for a special session of the General Assembly.  He said of his actions:

My position in this matter has been consistently misrepresented by a portion of the press.  I appointed Judge Thornton in good faith.  If the legislature meets, it becomes their duty to elect, and I hope he will be chosen by the General Assembly. (6)

The legislature did meet, and Thornton was said to be the favorite of the assembly; there were other names mentioned, Pujo being one of them.  When each aspirant was invited to address the assembly, giving his views and position in the Senate election, Pujo remarked:

Mr. President and gentlemen of the General Assembly, my friends have deemed it proper that I should appear before this body to-night in order that my position may be clearly understood.  I have not solicited the support of he General Assembly for election by the body, but I do want to say that it is my present purpose to submit my name to the people of Louisiana in the primary which will be held some time next year as a candidate for the Senate, for the vacancy expiring in 1915, or for such vacancy as might take place in the unexpired term of the late Senator McEnery. (7)

Sanders’ support of Thornton proved decisive, and he was elected by the legislature; Sanders had supported Thornton with the understanding Thornton would not seek the Senate post in 1915, because Sanders planned to run for the 1915 term.

The terms of Louisiana’s two senators expired two years apart, one in 1913 and the second in 1915.  A Democratic state primary was planned in 1912 for nomination of state officers in addition to nomination of a senator whose term began in 1913; however, under the provisions of Louisiana’s modified system of nominating senators, it was also necessary to nominate a senator for the 1915 term in the 1912 primary; no other primaries were planned before 1916.  Louisiana’s 1912 primary was unique in that two senators were to be nominated at the same time.  The legislature would still, however, elect each senator during the appropriate sessions, but would be guided by the results of the 1912 primary. (8)

Pujo’s success in the 1910 congressional race in the Seventh District no doubt played a major part in his decision to enter the Senate race in 1912.    The New Orleans Daily Picayune commented on Pujo’s political standing in the state in March, 1911, saying:

Congressman Pujo came out of his contest in the Seventh district last fall, in which he won over James J. Bailey by large majorities, with a certain prestige which has followed him ever since, and given him a standing in state affairs which he had not enjoyed heretofore.  This fact, his friends claim, will give him a strong leverage in the coming senatorial fight in this state. (9)

There were two candidates for the 1913 Senate term and three in the race for the 1915 term.  Incumbent Senator Murphy J. Foster was a candidate for re-election to the 1913 term, his opponent was Congressman Joseph E. Ransdell of the Fifth Congressional District.  The three candidates in the race for the 1915 term were Governor Sanders, Congressman Robert F. Broussard of the Third Congressional District, and Pujo.  In years of political experience, Pujo ranked third, a junior to Sanders and Broussard.  Sanders had been a member of the state legislature from 1892 to 1904, serving as Speaker of the House from 1900 to 1904; he served as lieutenant governor from 1904 to 1908, and in 1908 was elected governor.  Broussard had been a congressman for sixteen years, serving from the Fifty-Fifth to the Sixty-Second Congresses, and he was re-elected to the Sixty-Third Congress in 1910.

A report from New Orleans early in 1911 told “of an alleged attempt to form a political combination by which Senator Foster and Governor Sanders would be elected to the Senate, and Representative Ransdell would be chosen governor.”  Pujo said he knew nothing of the authenticity of the report but added, “should such be the fact, I have no criticism to make.” (10)  However, he did comment on the report in a Washington interview in which he said:

I do not believe that even politicians like Foster, Sanders, the seventeen fold ward leader combination in New Orleans, Ransdell and even Bob Broussard can make a political jackpot and get away with it, while the people are quietly looking on and have nothing to say about who shall represent them in the United States senate or rule as governor. (11)

The New  Orleans Item stated that Pujo had “nailed a fact” when he said it was time to end control by parish and ward leaders and a few candidates who “run the politics of Louisiana.”  The Item commended Pujo for “submitting his candidacy direct to the voters, instead of jockeying for place pleading for endorsement from whatever temporary powers there may be.” (12)   A few days later at a conference of ward leaders in New Orleans, the ward leaders agreed to support John Michel for governor and Sanders for the Senate. (13)

Independence Day, 1911, marked the opening of the state contests, and most of the political hopefuls gathered at Ruston for the occasion.  A New Orleans newspaper said of the meeting:

Probably the greatest political meeting ever witnessed in the State of Louisiana outside New Orleans in any recent years was that in Ruston to-day which celebrated jointly the Fourth of July and the opening of the state and senatorial complimentary and incidental mention in passing at the hands of the seven speakers.  It was political, it was Louisiana, devoted to her candidates and their ambitions. (14)

From ten to twelve thousand people attended the rally and heard first hand the claims, promises, and accomplishments of candidates for state and national offices.  Sanders was the first speaker, and he spent most of his time defending his state administration.  He said alleged extravagances of his administration had been used for the benefit of the state and not for personal gain.  As his time ran out, he made a statement which indicated the major issue he would pursue during the campaign. 

He remarked:

But I can tell you where I stand in a minute, boys…I am a Democrat, and if I go to the United States Senate I am going to do all I can to protect Louisiana interests, but I will do it as a Democrat, not as a Republican. (15)

Sanders, as well as some of the state’s leading newspapers, attacked the voting records of Broussard and Pujo.  Both had supported the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909; Broussard voted for both the bill that passed the House and the conference report; Pujo had voted for the House Bill and against the report.  Therefore, since they supported Republican protectionist principles on some issues, it was inferred they were sympathetic to the Republican Party.  The Baton Rouge New Advocate claimed the tariff was the major issue in the election and bitterly attacked Broussard and Pujo:

Mr. Broussard, like Mr. Pujo, is one of that great number of public men who have, during the past few years, failed to grasp the trend of times, failed to develop as public knowledge and public sentiment and official conscience and perception have developed, and thus have fallen short of measuring to that standard which progressive communities everywhere, irrespective of party, are requiring of those who seek promotion and preferment.

Messrs. Pujo and Broussard belong to an outgrown time, and the antiquity of their point of view, the inutility of their future service, is illustrated in all the words they utter. (16)

Pujo, in his opening speech at Ruston, cited some of the measures he had supported and aired some of his views on national issues.  He favored the income tax amendment, tariff for revenue based on difference in cost of production and transportation, a reasonable duty on raw materials, the direct election of senators, publicity of campaign contributions before and after elections, changes in currency legislation, and revocation of an executive order denying the right of petition to Federal employees for redress of grievances except through their department heads.  He condemned the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, saying he voted for the Farmers Free List Bill not because he favored it but as “palliative” of the reciprocity treaty.  Sanders, he said, should not be a candidate for the Senate because his candidacy was inconsistent with the stand he took in 1910 when he declined the Senate post.  He wanted to know how Sanders stood for tariff duties on sugar, rice, and lumber. (17)   Pujo’s vote for the Free List Bill and his vote to override a Taft veto on a bill reducing the tariff on wool indicated his tariff views were somewhat different from his earlier stand; perhaps he was aware of the increasing progressive movement to lower tariff rates and decided to cater to the proponents of lower rates for their support; however, he consistently held to the view that Louisiana’s products needed tariff protection. 

Broussard, in is Ruston address, said he would not belittle his opponents.  He emphasized that he was allied with no special interest groups; he voiced approval of the income tax, and said he supported a “sane and conservative” downward revision of the tariff.  On the question of loyalty to the Democratic Party, Broussard said he would abide by the wishes of Democratic caucuses at the national level unless these questions pertained to constitutional questions or pledges he made to constituents. (18)  Not long after the Ruston rally, Broussard apparently changed his mind about not belittling his opponents.  He said of Sanders:

Perhaps the governor judged it necessary to so declare himself (as a Democrat) in order that the people might locate him in the hazy political atmosphere that surrounds him at the capital. (19)

Throughout his years in Congress, Pujo had received the unswerving support of the Lake Charles Daily American-Press, and the 1912 contest did not alter the situation.  In fact, William E. Krebs, editor of the Lake Charles Newspaper, was Pujo’s campaign manager, and the paper defended Pujo’s record on every occasion.  In August, 1911, when the Homer Guardian-Journal referred to Pujo’s record as “a fair republican record in congress,” the American-Press termed the Homer paper “one of the panic-stricken adherents of Governor Sanders,” and proceeded to correct what is termed a misrepresentation on the part of the Guardian-Journal.  Pujo’s chairmanship of the House Committee on Banking and Currency was listed by the paper as evidence enough that he was in good standing with the national Democratic Party.  The American-Press admitted Pujo had been out of line with the national party on three occasions, but defended his stand in each instance;  he had voted against the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty, but, after all said the paper, it was a Republican measure and one which the Democratic Party had supported as a matter of expediency: he had voted for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, but he represented the greatest rice district in the United States and “was obliged to go to his republican colleagues to save it;” and he had voted for a tariff on lumber, although the Democratic Platform of 1908 had advocated free lumber, to save another important industry in his district.(20)   What the paper had failed to point out, however, was that some of the districts in the state were not primarily concerned with lumber or rice and would therefore not condone Pujo’s support of Republican Party measures; Louisiana, though predominately agricultural, had many diverse interests.

During the state campaign, Pujo traveled with and endorsed Supreme Court Justice-elect Luther E. Hall for the Good Government League of Louisiana, a reform group that had been organized to oppose the candidates supported by the Old Regulars (the New Orleans regular Democratic Party organization).  The League did not endorse any candidates for the Senate, but centered its campaign against the candidates supported by the Old Regulars.  Sanders had been endorsed by the New Orleans leadership, and Hall maintained Michel was linked to the Sanders state machine and the Old Regular organization.  James B. Aswell, president of Louisiana State Normal at Natchitoches, was the third gubernatorial candidate in 1912. (21)  The New Orleans Daily States intimated on August 21, 1911, that Pujo might be a candidate for governor, replacing Hall; it was also intimated that Pujo was merely in the Senate race to retire Sanders from public life because of Sanders’ support of James Bailey in the Seventh Congressional race in 1910; Pujo denied both reports and added he was in the Senate race to win. (22)

Sanders had been telling the voters of his loyalty to the Democratic Party and condemning the Republican Party attitudes of his opponents; Broussard retaliated at Amite when he blamed Sanders for the defeat of the income tax amendment in the state legislature and claimed Sanders was not a loyal Democrat since the party supported the amendment.  One newspaper said of Sanders’ part in the amendment’s defeat:

Jared Young Sanders, in the eyes of the national leaders of Democracy…with whom he is claiming, in his campaign speeches, to have standing and influence, is near kin to the spirit of Judas Iscariot and Benedict  Arnold.   Every one of them voted for the identical income tax amendment to the Constitution which Gov. Sanders, as the controller of the Legislature of 1910, caused Louisiana to reject. (23)

One August 5, in Baton Rouge, Sanders injected one of the old issues into the Senate contest; he attacked Pujo’s legal practice and branded him a tool of the corporations.  Pujo, in turn, fought fire with fire at Amite when he asked Sanders to list the corporations with which he had  been associated while a public official.  He said his professional associations had been initiated before he became a congressman whereas Sanders became a corporation lawyer after he was elected to public office.  Pujo said of Sanders:

 Your Democracy is Janus-faced.  You have one face to turn to the people before election, when you are profuse in the promises of great good that will flow to them if you are promoted in office, but at the same time your other face is turned to the interests of those who own great wealth and you wink and assure them that they will not suffer at your hands. (24)

The question remained: Both were corporation lawyers, and what influence did that have on their public careers?  Trying to answer the question is another matter, and any attempt to do so would only lead to speculation.

Pujo did not confine his remarks in the campaign to Sanders; at a rally in Kinder he said Broussard “was doing so well for the Third District that he should be retained there.”  He later accused Broussard of being trained with Republicans in Congress, “and of losing his Democratic cast.”   He maintained Broussard had been removed from a ranking position on the Committee on Ways and Means in the House when the Democrats regained control because of his unflinching support of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909.  He remarked:

The birds waged war with the beasts, and each party were by turns conquerors.  A bat, fearing the uncertain issues of the fight, always betook himself to that side which was the strongest. When peace was proclaimed his deceitful conduct was apparent to both the combatants.  Therefore, being condemned by each for his treachery, he was driven forth from the light of day, and henceforth concealed himself in dark hiding places, flying always alone and at night. (25) 

In the same issue in which it endorsed Sanders, the New Orleans Daily Picayune carried an article which indicated that Broussard had attacked the corporation ties of both Sanders and Pujo.  He said Pujo voted for the Payne-Aldrich Bill when it left the House because a provision levying an excise tax on corporations had been omitted, but that Pujo had voted against the conference report on the bill because it did contain an excise tax provision.  Following the state elections in 1912, when the House considered an excise tax on persons in business, Pujo was on an extended leave of absence because of an illness in his family and did not vote on the tax. (26) 

The state primary was scheduled for January 23, 1912.  A second primary, if necessary, would be held on February 27.  According to rules laid down by the Democratic State Central Committee, each State candidate was required to submit a list of campaign contributions and expenses to the secretary of the central committee on November 1 and December 1, 1911, and on January 1 and 15, 1912.  In addition, a new Federal law, mentioned previously in this paper, required a submission of a list of contributions and expenses to the secretary of the United States Senate ten days prior to the election.  Pujo’s total campaign expenses amounted to $4,367, and his attached statement noted that he received no campaign contributions and made no promises or pledges to anyone.  This apparently was a true statement, because each time Pujo submitted his lists of expenses, the newspaper commented on the absence of contributions from Pujo’s lists and termed the situation “unique.”  Sanders had received $12,929 in contributions and had spent $5,691 during the contest; he received four contributions of one thousand dollars each, three of five hundred dollars each, and numerous contributions from one hundred to three hundred dollars.  Broussard took in contributions totaling $3,928 up to November 1, 1911; he received one of the larger contributions during the campaign, $2,500 from W. H. Price of Thibodaux. (27)

The American-Press came to Pujo’s defense again in November, 1911, when the Monroe News-Star said he drew $7,500 annual salary as a representative and an additional $7,500 as a member of the National Monetary Commission.  The Lake Charles paper emphasized that he drew only the representative’s salary and that only those members of the monetary commission who were not congressmen drew $7,500 for their commission work. (28)  Meanwhile, some of the other leading newspapers of the state were lining up with the candidate of their choice.  The New Orleans Daily Picayune had already said “Foster and Sanders would make an incomparable team in the Senate.” (29)  Broussard and Pujo had been attacked by the Baton Rouge New Advocate, indicating the paper preferred Sanders.  The Shreveport Journal, in an editorial January 15, 1912, said:

The Senatorial race for the 1915 term, it appears to us, has resolved itself into a question:  Who can beat J. Y. Sanders?...

We are free to admit that the record of none of the three candidates for the 1915 term is such as to enthuse the old fashioned democracy of north Louisiana - it therefore becomes a matter of simple political expediency in choosing between Broussard and Pujo in opposition to Sanders.  Under such conditions, support of Broussard on the part of north Louisiana seems to be the logical thing to do.  (30)

Seven months after the campaign officially began, a campaign that produced bitterness from start to finish, the voters went to the polls to name candidates for state and Federal offices.  Enough votes had been tallied by the morning after the election to give some indication of how the state had voted; the Daily Picayune reported on January 24, that Sanders and Broussard were running neck and neck and Foster was leading Ransdell; the paper was a little premature in declaring Michel would be the next governor.  When unofficial returns were announced January 25, Hall led in the race for governor, Ransdell defeated Foster, and Broussard edged out Sanders.  Although Michel had qualified for the second primary in the governor’s race and Sanders in the Senate contest, both withdrew from the contest a few days after the first primary.  Sanders remarked:

It appeared to me that if it was determined to enter a second primary, state issues having already been voted upon, then my defeat, while not so in reality, would be heralded to the world as proof that Louisiana had repudiated the principles of progressive Democracy.

Such would not have been the case, but the appearance would have been there, and it would have been so represented to the nation by those whose interest it was to do so. (31)

By January 24, Pujo knew he was running last in the race.  He admitted his defeat was a personal disappointment, but one offset by the courtesies extended him by persons who were strangers to him before the campaign. (32)   He carried eight parishes in the state:  Bossier, Calcasieu, Cameron, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Morehouse, Vernon, and West Feliciana.  Broussard’s total vote was 50,263, Sander’s was 40,209, and Pujo was 26,621.  Pujo carried the Seventh District, polling 4,998 votes to 6,266 for Sanders and 5,912 for Broussard.  His largest vote, as was the case with the other two candidates, was in New Orleans where he polled 8,203 votes to 16,763 for Broussard and 12,979 for Sanders; in Calcasieu he got 2,870 votes, Sanders 1,201, and Broussard 827. (33) 

The New Orleans Item in an editorial after the election said the reform forces of the state owed a debt to Pujo for his support of the Good Government League and Governor-elect Hall. (34)  His support of the League, however, had not assured him of victory as in the case of Hall.  An analysis of the results of the election indicate Hall’s election was also due to his appeal to the voters; the defeat of the League’s nominee for lieutenant governor indicates Hall’s appeal. 

Pujo’s disappointment over losing the Senate was evidently so great that it was a primary reason for the announcement he made March 9, 1912, in which he said:

On account of professional and personal reasons I find it imperative that I retire from congress at the expiration of my present term of office and resume the practice of law.

I am deeply sensible of the many honors conferred upon me by the people of this district, whom I will have represented, when my present term expires, ten years in the congress of the United States.

I have no opposition for re-nomination and re-election, and, from information received, I would have none were I again to offer for the position.  But having devoted ten years of my life in the public service, and I consider with some degree of accomplishment, I consider it my duty to retire in order to give attention to my private affairs.

By my retirement I do not wish it understood that I intend to sever my connection with public affairs.  I propose in the future as in the past to take part, as a private citizen, in every movement looking to the best interests of the people of Louisiana.

To those who loyally supported me in the past I tender my most grateful thanks.  To those who did not, I bear no ill will.

I make this announcement now so that those who aspire to represent this district in congress may have ample time to inaugurate their campaign. (35)

That being a United States Representative for Louisiana is a fairly permanent position is indicated by the fact that only five men, in addition to Pujo, have held the Seventh Congressional post since the district was created.  Ladislas Lazaro of Evangeline Parish served from 1913 to 1927; Rene L. DeRouen of Evangeline served from 1927 to 1941; Vance Plauche of Lake Charles served from 1941 to 1943; Henry D. Larcade of Opelousas served from 1943 to 1953; and T. A. Thompson of Ville Platte began his first term in 1953 and at the time of this writing was serving his fifth term.

Prior to the Senate race, Pujo had proposed that the Democratic national committeeman from Louisiana be elected in Democratic primaries.  The normal procedure was selection of the committeeman by the Louisiana delegation to the national convention, which then approved the committeeman.  In a Washington interview, Pujo maintained that state and parish committeemen were named in the primaries, and that the national position should not be an exception.  He said he made the suggestion in May, 1911, in order that public sentiment on the idea might be sought prior to the January, 1912, state primary.  When the Democratic State Central Committee met in October, 1911, a resolution was approved which provided for naming the national committeeman in a primary; however, it was felt the January primary was too complex already so the central committee decided to set a date for naming the national committeeman when the committee met again in March, 1912.  But when the committee held a caucus in New Orleans in March, it was decided the committeeman would continue to be named at the state Democratic convention which selected delegates to the national convention.  Pujo was mentioned as a possible candidate for the national position and said he would serve if named, but added, “I am not a candidate for any office just now and will make no effort to secure one of any description.” (36)

Pujo was a delegate to the Democratic State Convention in June, 1912, and was named a delegate-at-large to the national convention which was to meet in Baltimore in the latter part of June.   The state convention was marked by a struggle between the supporters of Champ Clark for President and those who preferred Woodrow Wilson;  Clark was considered less progressive than Wilson.  The state convention decided the unit rule would not apply to the Louisiana delegation at the national convention; therefore, the Clark supporters controlled the delegation twelve votes to eight.  Pujo supported Clark in addition to delegates from the First, Second, Sixth, and half of the Seventh District; Wilson’s support came from half the Seventh and the Third and Fourth districts.  An ironical feature of Clark’s Louisiana support was that it came from the sugar districts of the states,   and Clark had voted for a bill providing for free entry of sugar into the United States which passed the House in March, 1912.  All of the Louisiana delegation in the House , which the exception of Representative John T. Watkins of the Fourth District, opposed the revocation of the sugar tariff; Pujo was on a leave of absence, but he was paired against the bill.  Although Pujo had been mentioned as a possible candidate for the Democratic National Committeemanship, incumbent Robert Ewing, editor of the New Orleans Daily States, was elected at the state convention; Ewing had been committeeman since 1908. (37)

The atmosphere surrounding the Louisiana delegation at Baltimore was similar to that at the state convention - “the…caucus was particularly heated, the struggle being between the Clark and Wilson delegates for election of officers.”  Pujo was named chairman of the delegation, and Ewing, a Wilson supporter, was confirmed as national committeeman.  The delegation split over the selection of a temporary chairman for the convention; two former presidential nominees, William Jennings Bryan and Alton B. Parker, were vying for the position. The vote was ten to ten, and Pujo supported Parker who was elected.  Clark led in the early balloting for the presidential nomination, but Wilson gradually gained support and was nominated on the forty-sixth ballot; Pujo and Representative Albert Estopinal were the only two members of the Louisiana delegation who voted for Clark on the final ballot. (38) 

After the close of the presidential election, Pujo was questioned about the upcoming presidential election and said he felt the Southern, Middle Western, and Eastern states would be almost solid for Wilson; he said ex-President Roosevelt, the Progressive Party candidate, would carry the West, and added, “It is not easy to forecast what Mr. Taft may carry, about nine-tenths of the nation having been spoken for by other candidates.”  He said he was glad Wilson was a Southern man, but emphasized that he, personally, was not sectional in his feeling. (39)  With that statement, Pujo made one of the most contradictory statements of his career:  he had been sectional-minded from the beginning of his political life to the end.

When the Seventh District Congressional primary was held in September to nominate a replacement for Pujo, Pujo did not endorse a candidate until the second primary.  Dr. Ladislas Lazaro of Evangeline Parish led in the first primary and faced John W. Lewis of Opelousas in the runoff; Pujo endorsed Lewis, saying Lewis had supported him since his first term and was a supporter of the Good Government League in the 1912 election.  Lazaro, however, was elected and served from the Sixty-Third to the Sixty-Ninth Congresses. (40)

From 1912 to the beginning of World War I, Pujo devoted most of his time to his Lake Charles legal practice; however, at the beginning of that conflict, he again became active in state affairs. An act of Congress, approved August 29, 1916, created the Council of National Defense which was given the responsibility for “coordination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare” and “creation of relations which will render possible in the time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.”  To supplement the activities of the National Council, state councils were created in twenty-three states by June 30, 1918.  Louisiana was one of those twenty-three; Act 7 of the Louisiana General Assembly of July, 1917, created the Louisiana State Council of Defense and appropriated $25,000 for its operations. 

Governor Ruffin G. Pleasant (1916-1920) appointed the thirty-one members of the state council, seven of whom were ex-officio members.  Members were chosen for special knowledge in subject matter fields, and the list included many of the State’s prominent citizens:   Former governors Luther Hall and Newton C. Blanchard, Democratic National Committeeman Robert Ewing, Dr. Rudolph Matas of New Orleans, and Pujo.  Members of the commission received no salary, but were allowed compensation for expenses.  Pujo was named to three committees of the council; they were the Committee on Finance, Committee on Legal Affairs and Legislation, and Committee on Port Protection and Facilities.  The council continued its work until the close of World War I. (41)

Also during World War I, Pujo served as chairman of the District Board of Selective Service for the Western District of Louisiana.  Three district boards were created in the state to decide on industrial exemptions from the draft and appeals from local selective service boards; appeals from these district boards had to be made directly to the President of the United States.  The board for the western district was created at Baton Rouge on August 9, 1917, at a meeting of the district boards called by the governor.  The board of nine members had jurisdiction over forty parishes, with headquarters in Shreveport.  The Shreveport Journal reported that Pujo struck the keynote of the joint sessions when he said:

So far we have been considering this whole matter the wrong way around.  We must take a different tone and anticipate dealing not with exemptions from service but with service to the government (in other words, ask not what your country can do for you, but what can you do for your country). It is primarily a question of service and secondarily a matter of, he who claims exemption must prove his right to it.  We hear nothing but exemptions on all sides...We have got to stand of this matter and back our president and our government.  And I do hope the state of Louisiana will take such a stand strongly, that it might properly shoulder its share of the burden. (42)

Newspaper reports of the joint meeting indicated that other members of the district boards took an even firmer stand in regard to exemptions from military service.  Pujo stated that each case would be tried on its own merits, and the board would not be governed by “ironclad rules.”  According to one account, many of Pujo’s rulings on the application of the act became the fixed policy of the United States Provost Marshal in administration of the Selective Service Act throughout the nation. (43)  As with the State Council of Defense, the selective service boards were active until the end of World War I.

Pujo took an active part in the Liberty Bond Drives in Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish during World War I; in June, 1917, he delivered the keynote address which initiated one of the bond drives in Lake Charles. The tone of his speech indicated he believed strongly in the bond drives, and, as in his selective service work, he stressed the duty of American citizens to contribute to the war effort. (44)

Following the war, Pujo continued his work in the Democratic Party organizations of the state, and in October, 1919, he was elected Democratic National Committeeman from Louisiana.  At a meeting of the Democratic State Central Committee in 1919, Robert Ewing, committeeman since 1908, resigned his position, and Pujo was elected to the vacancy by acclamation. He held the post until June, 1920, when Samuel Hicks of Shreveport, a personal choice of Governor-elect John M. Parker (1920-1924), was elected to the position. (45) 

During the last years of his life, Pujo was absorbed in his legal practice.  His ability in the profession was recognized in 1936, when he was given an honorary membership in the Tulane University chapter of the Order of the Coif, a legal fraternity; membership in the fraternity is considered one of the highest distinctions that is made to anyone in the field of law. (46)  Pujo admired Huey Long for his energy and extraordinary success, but on the question of more recent trends in national and state politics, Pujo had some reservations.  In a story reporting his death, one paper said:

Mr. Pujo did not entirely approve of present day political regimes in the United States and Louisiana but he was said to have been much more tolerant of New Deal policies than most men of his age and tradition. (47)

In December, 1939, Pujo went to New Orleans for a cataract operation but developed kidney trouble and pneumonia and died at Touro Infirmary on Sunday, December 31, 1939, at the age of seventy-eight. (48)   One obituary said of his political service:

Though his loyalty to his constituents was unswerving he answered unreasonable demands by declaring: “I am not the servant of the people, but the agent of the people.” (49)

Was Pujo truly an agent of the people?  Did he accomplish or advocate those measures which resulted in improved conditions for those in whose behalf he was acting?  This question might be answered by surveying Pujo’s participation in four areas of activity: local, district, state, and national.

In Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish, he was associated with projects designed to promote a progressive community, both economically and intellectually.  As a member of the Lake Charles Board of Trade, he was successful in helping to obtain improvements to areas transportation; while in Congress, he secured appropriations resulting in permanent improvement to local waterways.  The major waterway serving Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish is the Calcasieu River, a river which begins in Vernon Parish and flows southward to the Gulf of Mexico.  About twenty-two miles from the Gulf, the river emerges into Calcasieu Lake; the connection between the lake and the Gulf, called Calcasieu Pass, is about seven miles long.  Among the improvements to the Calcasieu River made possible by appropriations secured by Pujo ware; a survey of the lake and pass in 1905; a channel 24,000 feet long, 100 feet wide, and seven feet deep at the head of the pass; a rebuilt revetment along the channel; a channel 10,000 feet long, 100 feet wide, and seven feet deep at the head of the lake; and a re-dredged channel at the head of the pass in 1911. (50)

Perhaps the most notable contribution Pujo made in regard to water-way improvement was the effort he made to secure that portion of the Intracoastal Canal from the Mermentau to Sabine Rivers.  From his request for the Canal in 1907 until the appropriation of funds in 1910, Pujo made the struggle for that portion of the canal a personal one.  The Calcasieu-Sabine section was opened June 24, 1915, and deepened and widened in 1917; the Mermentau-Calcasieu section was completed December 29, 1922.  This sixty-two mile canal is one of the links in the larger canal spanning the area from the Mississippi River in Louisiana to the Rio Grande River in Texas. (51)  Its construction proved not only a major commercial benefit to Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish, but to the entire Gulf Coast area. 

The Intracoastal Canal paved the way for efficient transportation of the economic products of the Seventh Congressional District, but what of the threat to these products from foreign competitors?  It was in this area that Pujo demonstrated, perhaps as in no other field, his sectional attitudes.  He did not believe in free trade; this was evident throughout his congressional career when he opposed any measure he felt was harmful to the rice, lumber, or sugar interests of his district.  His opposition to these measures, at times, did not agree with national Democratic Party policy - the party to which he was said to be sincerely devoted!  He fought the Philippine Tariff Bills when he thought rice interests were threatened; refused to vote for the Payne-Aldrich Tariff until protection was given the lumber and rice interests of his district; strongly advocated defeat of the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty on the grounds Canadian goods would compete with Louisiana products; voted against the Free Sugar Bill; and wanted protective tariffs for Louisiana products, although the Democratic Party advocated revenue tariffs.

In his view on the tariff, Pujo was narrowly practical, but not consistent; he wanted protection for Louisiana products, but condemned the protectionist features of tariffs which benefited the industrial North.  He did, however, distinguish between a tariff which was overly protective and one which provided just enough protection to give American producers the edge in the consumer market.  He advocated a tariff which took into consideration the cost of production plus the cost of transportation, a viewpoint very much in line with the Republican Party concept of the tariff in the early part of the twentieth century.

In addition to tariff protection and waterway improvements for his district, Pujo introduced legislation which resulted in Federal buildings and post offices being started, improved, or completed at Lake Charles, Crowley, Jennings, and Alexandria.  During his first term in Congress, he was successful in having a branch of the United States District Court established at Lake Charles.

Paramount among Pujo’s state contributions were his participation in the anti-lottery movements of 1888 and 1892 and in the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1898.  Although it is impossible to determine his motives for joining the anti-lottery crusade, the lottery was defeated and the people of the state and nation benefited.  As a member of the constitutional convention, Pujo introduced and advocated far reaching changes in state government; he was author of changes in the state’s judicial system, supported establishment of the State Railway Commission (later the Public Service Commission), and was chairman of the group at the convention advocating a poll tax provision for the constitution, the proceeds of which were to be used for public education.  One of the most infamous features of the 1898 constitution was the “grandfather clause,” which practically eliminated the Negro vote in Louisiana.  Whatever critics of the convention might say about the clause, the question of whether Pujo and other delegates were acting for the benefit of the state must be judged in the light of their time.  To their way of thinking this was the thing to do.

Pujo had definite ideas about national issues of his day.  He opposed acquisition of the Philippines, saying American capitalist would use the islands to enhance their monetary fortunes.  On a number of occasions, Pujo criticized the industrial and financial concentration in the United States, a concentration he termed on one occasion the “Morganization of capital.”  He respected the policies of Theodore Roosevelt and said he felt Roosevelt was sincere in his attempts to regulate railroads and trusts and felt the people would benefit from Roosevelt’s administration. 

While conservative in his tariff views, Pujo supported many progressive measures at the national level. Among them were the Federal income tax, direct election of senators, regulation of railroads, government supervision of interstate drugs and food through the provisions of the Pure Food and Drug Act, Employers’ Liability Act, publication of campaign contributions, limiting hours of work for railroad employees, establishment of a bureau of mines, and increased salaries for Federal employees and persons engaged in public works projects.

Pujo’s role in the Democratic Party was one which, on many occasions, transcended territorial boundaries; he participated in its deliberations on all levels and was  instrumental in supporting party policies which served to promote more democracy in all levels of government.  He was a strong advocate of political parties, believing parties gave unity to government and made possible progressive programs.  One of the most democratic measures adopted during the first decade of the twentieth century was the direct primary for nomination of candidates to local, state, and national offices.  Pujo was an ardent believer in primaries and urged their use in local and state elections; in 1911, he suggested the primary be used to name the national Democratic committeeman from Louisiana. Every political contest Pujo entered was decided by the direct primary method; his first congressional nomination was decided by the primary for the first time in the district of which Calcasieu Parish was a part.

Some references to Pujo label him a “conservative from a conservative state.”  Some might as readily refer to him as a progressive because of his support of progressive measures. This writer feels, however, that any attempt to equate Pujo with either label is well-nigh impossible.  In the final analysis, the inability to distinguish a definite trend in his political thinking might be a tribute to his career.
 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

 

Government Documents

Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session of May, 1902.  Baton Rouge, 1902.

Biennial Report of the Secretary of State of Louisiana. Baton Rouge, 1898-1912.
 

Campaign Text Book of the Democratic Party.  Chicago, 1908.

Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 1 Sess., - 62 Cong., 3 Sess. Washington, 1903-1913.

Constitution of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1898.

Council of National Defense. First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense.  Washington, 1917.

__________. Second Annual Report of the Council of National Defense.  Washington, 1917.

Democratic State Central Committee of Louisiana.  The Convention of '98.  New Orleans, 1898.

Louisiana State Council of Defense. Names and Officers and Members of State and Parish Councils.  Baton Rouge (n.d.)

Official Congressional Directory. Washington, 1903-1913.

Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, 1898.

Report of the Secretary of State of Louisiana.  Baton Rouge, 1912.

Roster of Selective Service Officials and Organizations in the State of Louisiana.  Baton Rouge, 1918.

Statutes at Large, XXXIII-XXXVII. Washington, 1905-1913.

United States Bureau of the Census.  Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920.  Manufactures, X.  Washington, 1923.

U. S. House of Representatives, 58 Cong., 3 Sess.,  Statistics Bearing Upon the Ginning of Cotton.  Document 216.  Washington , 1905.

U. S. House of Representatives, 62 Cong., 3 Sess.,  Investigation of Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States before Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency.   2 vols. Washington, 1912-1913.

U. S. House of Representatives, 62 Cong.,  3 Sess.,  Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit.  House Report 1593. Washington , 1913.

U. S. Senate, 62 Cong.,  2 Sess.,  Report of the National Monetary Commission.  Document 243.  Washington, 1912.

U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army.  Washington, 1913-1924.  

Newspapers

Baton Rouge (Louisiana) Daily State Times, 1908.

Baton Rouge (Louisiana) New Advocate, 1912.

Baton Rouge (Louisiana) State Times, 1917, 1920.

Colfax (Louisiana) Chronicle, 1908, 1910.

Crowley (Louisiana) Daily Signal, 1902, 1910.

Lake Charles (Louisiana) American, 1889-1896.

 
Lake Charles (Louisiana) Daily American, 1897.
 

Lake Charles (Louisiana) Daily American, 1898-1910.

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Lake Charles (Louisiana) American Press, 1912-1913, 1917, 1919, 1939-1940.

New Orleans Daily Picayune, 1887-1886, 1890-1891, 1898, 1900, 1902-1903, 1910-1912.

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New Orleans Times Picayune, 1940.

New York Times, 1911-1913.

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Opelousas (Louisiana) Courier, 1902.

Shreveport (Louisiana) Journal, 1912, 1917.

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Periodicals

Brandeis, Louis D. “Serve One Master Only,” Harper’s Weekly, LVIII (December 13, 1913), 10-120.

__________. “What Publicity Can Do,” Harper’s Weekly, LVIII (December 20, 1913), 10-130.

Lawson, Thomas W.  “The Remedy,” VII, “Keep Your Eye on Washington,” Everybody’s Magazine, XXVIII (May, 1913), 649-55.

“‘Money-Trust’ Attack and Defense,” Literary Digest, IVL (March 15, 1913), 560-61.

“Pujo,” Literary Digest, XLVI (February 8, 1913), 306-308.

Tarbell, Ida.  “The Hunt for a Money Trust,” American Magazine, LXXV (May, 1913), 11-17.

“The Commission and the Currency,” Nation, IXC (November 24, 1910), 508-509.

“The Late Pujo Committee,” Outlook, CIII (March 15, 1913), 568-69.

“The Monetary Commission’s Report,” Nation, VIC (January 11, 1912), 26.

“The ‘Money Trust,’” Nation, VC, (December 19, 1912), 599.

“The Money Trust,” Nation, IVC, (January 16, 1913), 67.

“The Money-Trust Inquiry,” Nation, VIC (June 6, 1912), 575.

“The Money Trust,” Outlook, CIII (March 8, 1913), 511-12.

“The Money-Trust Evidence,” Literary Digest, XLVI (January 4, 1913), 1-3.

“The ‘Money - Trust’ Investigation,” Outlook, CIII (January 4, 1913), 2.

“The ‘Money - Trust’ IRecommendations,” Journal of Political Economy, XXI (April, 1913), 355-57.

“The Pujo Recommendations,” Outlook, CIII (March 15, 1913), 569.

“The Pujo Report,” Nation, IVC (March 6, 1913), 224-25.

Willis, H. Parker.  “The Banking Question in Congress,” Journal of Political Economy, XX (November, 1912), 877.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Periodicals

Alwes, Bethold C. “The History of the Louisiana State Lottery Company,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXVII (October, 1944), 964-1118.

Grantham, Dewey W., Jr. “Southern Congressional Leaders and the New Freedom, 1913-1917,” Journal of Southern History, XIII (November 1947), 445-46.

King, A. O. “Calcasieu Lawyers of Yesteryear,” McNeese Review, III (Spring, 1950), 85-86.

McWhiney, Grady.  “Louisiana Socialists in the Early Twentieth Century:  A Study in Rustic Radicalism,” Journal of Southern History, XX (August, 1956), 323.    

Mitchell, Wesley C. “The Publications of the National Monetary Commission," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXV (May, 1911), 563-93.

Romero, Sidney James, Jr.  “The Political Career of Murphy James Foster, Governor of Louisiana, 1892-1900,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXVIII (October, 1945), 1129-43.

Ulmer, Grace.  “Economic and Social Development of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, 1840-1912,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XXXII (July, 1949), 519-630.

Books

Chapman, Charles C.  The Development of American Business and Banking Thought. 1913-1936.  New York, 1936.

Dictionary of American Biography. IV,  New York, 1940.

Ezell, John Samuel.  Fortune’s Merry Wheel:  The Lottery in America.  Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

Fortier, Alcee (ed.) Louisiana:  Comprising Sketches of Parishes, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons.  3 vols.  n.p. 1914.

Glass, Carter.  An Adventure in Constructive Finance.  Garden City, New York, 1927.

Hicks, John D.  The Populist Revolt:  A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961.

Laughlin, J. Laurence. The Federal Reserve Act:  Its Origin and Problems.  New York, 1933.

Link, Arthur Stanley.  “The South and the Democratic Campaign of 1912.”  Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1945.

Louisiana-Texas Waterways Corporation Operating Over the Intracoastal Canal. (n.p., n.d.)

Mendelson, Wallace.  Justices Black and Frankfurter:  Conflict in the Court.  Chicago, 1961.

Morris, Richard B. (ed.) Encyclopedia of American History. New York 1953.

Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt:  1900-1912.  New York, 1958.

Myers, Margaret G.  The New York Money Market:  Origin and Development.  4 vols. New York, 1931.

Nevins, Allen.  John D. Rockefeller:  The Heroic Age of American Enterprise.  2 vols. New York, 1941.

Rogers, Lindsay.  The American Senate. New York, 1926.

Taussig, F. W. The Tariff History of the United States.   New York, 1931.

Warburg, Paul M.  The Federal Reserve System:  Its Origin and Growth.  New York, 1930.

Willis, Henry Parker.  The Federal; Reserve System: Legislation, Organization and Operation.  New York, 1923.

Woodward, C. Van.  Origins of the New South, 1812-1913.

Personal Interview            

Porter, Thomas.  Personal interview, January 18, 1962.

APPENDIX